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THE LEGISLATIVE REAPPORTIONMENT PROBLEM
IN OUR COURTS
By

NORMAN GROVE*
INTRODUCTION

During the past generation the problem of state legislative
apportionment or "malapportionment" has become increasingly
important due to population shifts. As America develops into a
predominantly urban nation' the apportionment schemes set up
ten to sixty years ago in the various states become more burdensome. Today, majorities in the senates of thirty-three states represent fewer than forty per cent of the states' populations and the
situation is virtually the same in the lower houses. 2 The Colorado
Constitution requires, as do most state constitutions, that the legislature reapportion its seats after every federal census. However,
this type of constitutional mandate is frequently ignored by state
legislatures. Thus, the problem arises that many legislators in our
state governments are elected on an apportionment scheme based
on the population-area ratio of their state as it existed around the
turn of the century.
The purpose of this paper is to examine decisions of the courts
regarding reapportionment and to note their underlying philosophy.
Looking briefly at the matter from an historical viewpoint, the
problem in the early 1900's was of a different nature from that
which confronts us today. State legislatures were then equitably
apportioned since their population centers had not changed radically from the time of the most recent apportionment legislation.
However, in the past fifty years our country has experienced a
great population shift. This shift has occurred not only from one
area of the country to another, but from one part of a state to
another. Apportionment laws of the various states have not been
amended so as to reflect these changes.
Earlier cases which challenged the validity of an apportionment act were of two types. First, suits were brought against a
recently enacted apportionment law. Such suits have always succeeded when the new act was found discriminatory. 4 Secondly,
actions were frequently brought against individual election officials, seeking to restrain them from holding the next election
under the new apportionment act. These officials were usually
enjoined and directed to hold the election under an-older act which
had presumably not been repealed. 5
The problem today is of a different nature. Many of our state
legislatures have failed to reapportion since the 1910 or 1920 federal
censuses. Thus, the voter is confronted with a type of silent gerry*Recent graduate, University of Denver College of Low.
1 106 Cong. Rec. 13827 (daily ed. June 29, 1960).
2 Id. at 13828. Indeed, seventy percent of our population now resides in cities or urban areas.
3 Colo. Const. art. 5, §45.
4 Stiglitz v. Shardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W. 2d 315 (1931); Ragland v. Anderson, 125, Ky. 141,
100 S.W. 865 (1907); Giddings v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892).
5 Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Cornm'n, 224 Mass. 598, 113 N.E. 581 (1916);
Bo-rd of Supervisors v. Blacker, 92 Mich. 638. 52 N.W. 951 (1892); State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W. 724 (1892). See also, People ex ref. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. 827 (1893), wherein the court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the
Kings County Board of Supervisors to divide the county into legislative districts of equal population.
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mandering resulting from legislative inaction. This problem often
occurs because the present-day plaintiff does not seek to invalidate
a re-ently enacted apportionment law, but seeks to compel the
passage of a new act or have an old one invalidated. Historically
the plaintiff sought relief through the medium of a writ of man-6
damus. A typical early example was the case of Fergus v. Marks,
wherein the plaintiff sought to compel the legislature to pass appropriate legislation in accordance with a constitutional mandate
directing that "the general assembly shall reapportion" after every
federal census. 7 The court refused to grant such relief, basing its
reasons on the separation of powers doctrine and stating that the
duty to reapportion was upon the legislature and the remedy for
its failure to perform lay with the people, not the courts. This gave
rise to a series of other cases in Illinois where by varying methods,
the same ends were sought.8 All met the same fate as the original
Fergus decision. These cases emphasized the court's philosophy of
refusing to allow a plaintiff to do by indirect means that which
was disallowed by direct methods. A novel question raised by one
of these Illinois cases 9 was whether legislators elected under an
invalid apportionment act were qualified to continue in office.
The same question has arisen in other states and it is generally
conceded that the legislature is the sole judge of the election returns and the qualifications of its members. 10 Courts usually hold
that such legislators are dejure members and not merely de facto.
It should be noted that the courts are dealing with apportionment acts which were valid when passed, but which became discriminatory due to population shifts. Courts are not hesitant to
test the validity of a new apportionment act, but they are reluctant
when an old act is challenged as having become invalid as a result
of a population shift. This is true even though the constitutional
mandate to reapportion is violated.1
Some of the reasons advanced by the federal courts for denying relief have been: (1) such cases involve questions of a "pe1
culiarly political nature" which should be left to the legislature; 2
(2) a decision which compelled a legislature to reapportion would
13
violate the separation of powers doctrine;
and (3) federal court
14
interference violates state sovereignty.
6 321 Ill,
510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926).
7 III. Const. art. 4, §6 (a provision common to many state constitutions).
8 Fergus v. Kinney, 333 III. 437, 164 N.E. 665 (1928) (action to enjoin the state treasurer from paying the salaries of legislators on grounds that failure to reapportion prevented the legislature from
being a legallyconstituted body); People ex rel. Fergus v. Blackwell, 342 III. 223, 173 N.E. 750 (1930)
(quo warranto seeking to oust legislators on ground that they had been elected under an unconstitutional act); People v. Clardy, 334 III. 160, 165 N.E. 638 (1929) (a convicted criminal sought to have
statute under which he was convicted declared void on grounds that it was passed by a legislature
elected under an invalid apportionment act); Daly v. Madison, 378 Ill.
357 38 N.E.2d 160 (1941) (injunction sought against the expenditure of public funds to carry on election under invalid apportionment act).
9 Fergus v. Kinney, supra note 8,
10 People v. Clardy, supra note 8; Fesler v. Brayton, 145 Ind.71, 44 N.E. 37 (1896); In re Sherrill,
188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907); Jones v. Freeman, 193 Oka. 554, 146 P.2d 564 (1944); State ex rel
Sullivan v. Schnitger, 16 Wyo. 479, 95 Pac. 698 (1908).
11 Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D.Tenn. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 81 Sup. Ct. 230 (1960);
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Butcher v. Rice, 397 Pa. 150, 153 A.2d 869 (1959).
12 Colegrove v. Green, supra note 11.
13 Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957). affirming 145 F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Okla. 1956); Remmey
v. Smith, 102 F. Supp. 708 (E.D.Pa. 1951), off'd per curiam, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Colegrove v. Green,
supra note 11; Perry v. Folsom, 144 F. Supp. 874 (N.D.Ala. 1956); accord, Smith v. Holm, 220 Minn.
486, 19 N.W.2d 914 (1945).
14 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); Colegrove v.
Green, supra note 11; but cf., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959), rev'd, 81 Sup. Ct.
125 (1960), wherein the Court of Appeals felt bound by the Colegrove philosophy, but the Supreme
Court reversed. See generally, Greenfield, Ford and Emery, Legislative Apportionment: California in
National Perspective 24 (Bureau of Public Administration, University of California 1959).
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In addition to these objections, state courts have introduced
a variety of ideas: (1) invalidating one apportionment act and then
falling back upon an earlier act; 15 (2) requiring an election-at-large
until the legislature draws up valid districts;' 6 (3) invoking the
doctrine of laches, in that the act should have been attacked when
passed and it is now too late;"7 and (4) refusing to recognize that
the passage of time could invalidate a previously valid act.' 8
I. COURT DECISIONS

A. The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court's reaction to the apportionment problem
has been somewhat typical of all courts. An early decision, Smiley
v. Holm,' 9 involved a suit by a Minnesota citizen challenging an
act of the Minnesota Legislature2 0 which apportioned the state into
nine congressional districts. The house directed that the bill be
lodged with the Secretary of State, notwithstanding the governor's
veto. The Minnesota district court dismissed the case, the state
supreme court affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding
the act void. The Supreme Court took jurisdiction in spite of the
political nature of the case with the view that to allow the election
to proceed under the act without the governor's signature would
not only enforce an invalid law, but would deny the plaintiff his
federal constitutional rights.2 The Court held the act invalid and
ordered election-at-large of the state's congressmen. The companion
cases of Koenig v. Flynn 22 and Carroll v. Becker 2 3 involved identical questions (although arising in different states) which were
decided at the same time and under the same authority as the
Smiley case.
15 See,

e.g., Ragland v.

Anderson,

125 Ky. 141,

100 S.W. 865 (1907); Giddings v. Blacker,

supra

note 4. See also Lewis, Legislative Apportionntent and the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057,
1068 (1958).
16 Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932). This is not an entirely inappropriate relief since it at least allows every voter to have an equally powerful vote. The Supreme Court has
also approved this type of relief. See, e.g., Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932). But see Lamson v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 168 N.E.2d 480 (Mass. 1960), wherein the Massachusetts court disapproved of the election-at-large as a method of forcing the legislature to act.
11 Adams v. Bosworth, 126 Ky. 61, 102 S.W. 861 (1907).
1 Daly v. County of Madison, supro note 8; Smith v. Holm, supra note 13.
19 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
20 Minn. Laws 1931, p. 640.
21 U.S. Const. art. 1, § 4 provides: "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for SenaIt
tors and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state, by the Legislature thereof ..---...
was held that since the state constitution provided for the governor's signature or an overriding vote
an act of the legislature was not complete without one or the other.
22 285 U.S. 375 (1932).
23 285 U.S. 380 (1932).
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Colegrove v. Green,24 the leading reapportionment case, involved an inequitable congressional districting law passed in 1901,
wherein the plaintiffs, voters of Cook County, sought to restrain
officers of the state from conducting, an election pursuant to the
act. The federal district court - 5 stated that the denial of a citizen's
right to choose a representative on terms of equality is prohibited
by the federal constitution, but held that it was bound by the

26
decision of Wood v. Broom, which determined that a 1911 Missis-

sippi apportionment act was valid. A majority affirmed the case
on other grounds, although the Court was badly split. Mr. Justice
Fankfurter, with Justices Reed and Burton concurring, felt that
the Court should withhold jurisdiction since the Constitution conferred upon Congress the exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the states in the House. 27 Perhaps the real reason for
Justice Frankfurter's holding is that portrayed by his statement
that "the Court ought not to enter this political thicket."2 S Justice
Rutledge concurred specially on the ground that jurisdiction to
grant relief arose under Smiley v. Holm, 29 but that the case was

of such a delicate political nature that the Court shouJd avoid it.
Mr. Justice Black, with whom Justices Douglas and Murphy joined
dissenting, reasoned that the complaint stated a justiciable case
and controversy and that the Court had jurisdiction to act under
the rule that the federal courts will not hesitate to grant relief,
where there has been a federally protected right invaded. The dissenters stated that: "The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment forbids such discrimination. It does not permit the
S ates to pick out certain qualified citizens or groups of citizens
to deny them the right to vote at all. 3 0 In conclusion, Mr. Justice
Black distinguished Wood on the ground that it merely decided
that the Mississippi Reapportionment Act did not violate the Congressional Reapportionment Act of 1929. Therefore, the case did
not preclude the granting of equitable relief here since the question
in Colegrove had never been decided (whether the Court should
take jurisdiction and grant relief in such a political issue). A
majority in the Colegrove case felt that the Court had jurisdiction,
but Mr. Justice Rutledge, siding with the majority, decided that
the Court should not act due to the political nature of the problem. It is important that this factor be kept in mind since all the
later apportionment cases cite Colegrove as authority.
The next case, involving an analogous political problem, was
MacDougall v. Green.31 There the plaintiff, the Progressive Party,
attacked the validity of an Illinois statute requiring a certain number of signatures from each county to form a new political party.
24 Supra note 11.

25 64 F. Supp. 632 (N.D.111. 1946).
26287 U.S. 1 (1932). The case held that the Reapportionment Act of August 8, 1911, cs amended
by the Reapportionment Act of June 18, 1929, did not require that congressional election distr:cts be
" Therefore,
"...
contiguous and compact territory and as nearly as possible equal population ....
the Mississippi reapportionment act in quest:on was valid. This being the case, the Court said that
it would not consider relief in equity nor the justiciability of the questions in controversy. Four Fusticcs
felt that it was not necessary to decide the validity of the 1911 Reapportionment Act since the ccse

could be dismissed for mere want of equity. Thus, the political aspects of the case were never considered.
27 U.S. Const. art. 1, §2.

2 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1945).
29 295 U.S. 355 (1932).
30 328 U.S. 549, 569 (1945). As authority for this statement Justice Black cited Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927) and N'xon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
31 355 U.S. 281 (1948).
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The plaintiffs charged that the statute discriminated against the
most populous counties and challenged its validity under the
fourteenth amendment as well as sections 1 and 2 of the seventeenth
amendment. 32 The Court decided that since suit was brought on
the eve of the Illinois election, relief should not be granted so as
to disrupt the State's political system. Justices Black, Douglas and
Murphy dissented on much the same grounds as they did in Colegrove, stating that here some citizens would have much more voting power than other citizens; therefore, the act was violative of
the fourteenth amendment.
In South v. Peters,33 plaintiffs challenged the Georgia county
unit system for determining the outcome of primary elections as
unconstitutional under the fourteenth and seventeenth amendments. The Court refused to exercise its equity powers on the
ground that the problem was of a political nature and that states
retained the power to distribute their electoral strength as they
chose. Although the case can be distinguished on the basis that
a state has always been able to choose the manner in which it
distributes its electoral strength, the Court admittedly followed its
prior conservative pattern.
Kidd v. McCanless,34 involved an outmoded 1901 apportionment
act. The plaintiff sought to have the act declared invalid on the
ground that it had become unconstitutional under the fourteenth
amendment and in the alternative requested the issuance of a writ
of mandamus to compel an election-at-large. The state supreme
court held that the de facto doctrine did not apply to members of
the general assembly in office. Consequently there could be no
existing legislature if the present act were struck down since there
was no prior act upon which to rely. The alternative relief was
also refused because the state constitution did not provide for an
election-at-large. The United States Supreme Court dismissed the
appeal, evidencing the Colegrove attitude not to enter such "political thickets."
There is some evidence, however, that the Supreme Court may
be preparing to do an about face. The Court recently held that an
Alabama statute reducing the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee
was in violation of the fifteenth amendment. 35 The statute in question redefined the city's boundaries so as to exclude all Negroes
in the district from voting. The lower court held that although
the statute might be violative of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendments, the motives of the legislature could not be questioned since
they had the exclusive power to redefine municipalities' boundaries. 36 Due to the political nature of the matter the court refused
to grant relief. The Supreme Court reversed, basing its holdings
on the fifteenth amendment's guarantee of the right to vote, regardless of color. Mr. Justice Douglas concurred on the grounds of his
dissent in Colegrove. Mr. Justice Whittaker concurred on the
32 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1, which provides that "'... No State shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the orivileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person . . . the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XVII is concerned with the qualifications of Senators from each state and the executive authority to fill vacancies.
33 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
34 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40, appeal dismissed, 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
35 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
36 270 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1959).
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ground that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment controlled, and that the fifteenth was applicable only when
one or a part of a group's voting rights had been abridged. Here,
petitioner enjoyed the same voting rights as all other voters in
the new district, but the voting rights of all of the voters had
been abridged.
In a Tennessee case, 37 indistinguishable from Colegrove on the
facts, a three-judge federal district court found that due to population shifts the Tennessee apportionment act, in force since 1901,
violated both state and federal constitutions. 38 However, the reasoning of Colegrove was followed. The court reiterated that the
remedy did not lie in the courts. Perhaps the fact that the Supreme
Court noted probable jurisdiction of Baker indicates that Colegrove will be reconsidered.
B. The Lower Federal Courts
The history of apportionment cases in the lower federal courts
has been analogous to the Supreme Court decisions, although there
is now evidence that the Colegrove doctrine is weakening in some
39
jurisdictions. Three cases arose during the early and middle fifties
in which the plaintiffs sought to have old existing apportionment
acts declared invalid and an injunction or mandamus issued to
compel the legislatures to pass new apportionment acts in accordance with ignored constitutional mandates. In each of these cases
relief was specifically denied on "political nature" grounds. During
this same period another case was decided by the federal district
court in Hawaii, departing from the traditional view.40 The action
was brought under the Federal Civil Rights Act 41 upon the claim
that a failure to reapportion, as. required by Organic Act of Hawaii,42 for a period of fifty-five years amounted to a denial of the
petitioner's rights as guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The court found a deprivation of equal protection and declared the apportionment act invalid. This case has often been
distinguished by the fact that it involved only a federal-territorial
relationship. However, strong dictum indicated that the court would
have decided
the same way regardless of the relationship in43
volved.
In 1958, a case decided by the Federal District Court of Minnesota seemed to indicate a break with the strict Colegrove doctrine.44
A three-judge court took jurisdiction of the controversy, cited the
school segregation cases, and noted that the old Minnesota Appor37 Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
38 Tenn. Const. art. 2, §§ 4-6 (1870).
39 Radford v. Gary, supra note 13; Remmey v. Smith, supro note 13; Perry v. Folsom, supra
note 13.
40 Dyer v. Kazuh'sa Abe, 138 F. Supp. 220 (D.Hawaii 1956).
41 Rev. Stat. §1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1959).
42 31 Stat. 141 (1900), as amended, 48 U.S.C. §§ 491-723 (1959), as amended, 48 U.S.C. §§ 536-723
(Supp. 1959).
43 "We believe there should be a broader ground for sustaining the action of this Court than the
special nature of territorial-federal relations. The Supreme Court has stricken any attempts to discriminate in elections because of race, creed or color . . . . The time has come, and the Supreme
Court has marked the way, when serious consideration should be given to a reversal of the traditional
reluctance of judicial intervention in legislative reapportionment ....
" 138 F. Supp. 220, 226. As
authority for this lost statement the court cited Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), a leading case concerning federal intervention in the area of segregation and discrimination.
44 MaGraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901 (D.Minn. 1958), per curiam, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D.Minn.
1958). The Court determined it had jurisdiction, but refrained from acting in the second case to af.
ford the legislature a full opportunity to "heed the constitutional mandate to redistrict."
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tionment Act of 1913 violated the fourteenth amendment. Jurisdiction was retained and decision deferred until the legislature could
have further opportunity to act. Apparently the case caused some
consternation in the legislature for a new apportionment act was
quickly passed
and the pending suit dismissed upon motion by the
45
petitioner.

It is significant that these later federal cases involved actions
seeking to have the existing apportionment acts declared invalid
while the prior three cases sought to compel the legislatures to
pass new apportionment acts. It therefore becomes clear why the
courts absolutely refused relief in the earlier cases and granted
it in the latter two, where plaintiff's requested relief was within
the court's power to grant.
C. The State Courts
State apportionment cases have followed the federal pattern.
New apportionment acts which are discriminatory in nature have
almost always been struck down. 46 Old acts are presumed valid,
and the courts will generally refuse to invalidate them.4 The
cases here discussed should be distinguished from those involving
actions against special apportionment agencies or boards. A court
will usually feel free to compel such agencies or boards to act since
there is no constitutional problem of separation of powers involved. 48 These cases, in practically every instance, involve a new
act and hence are not precedent for overturning an old apportionment act.
In Donovan v. Holzman,49 the Illinois Court upheld the validity
of a recent reapportionment act, but stated:
At the outset, we think it clear that this court has the
power to strike down an apportionment act which is violative of the clear requirements of the constitution ....

The

mere fact that political rights and questions are involved
does not create immunity from judicial review. 0°
This language appears to fly in the face of Colegrove, although
it can be reconciled on the basis that a new apportionment act
was involved. In Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 51 the New
Jersey Court took jurisdiction of an action in which the petitioner
sought to have the old apportionment act declared unconstitutional
45 MaGraw v. Donovon,

177 F. Supp. 803 (D.Minn.

1959).

46 Cases cited note 4 supra.
47 Butcher v. Rice, supra note 11; Smith v. Holm, supro note 13; Daly v. County of Madison,
supra note 8.
48 Preisler v. Doherty, 365 Mo. 460, 284 S.W.2d 427 (1955) (involidation of a redistricting order
made by a reapportionment agency); Pickens v. Board of Apportionment, 220 Ark. 145, 246 S.W.2d
556 (1952) (the court not only invalidated the board's action, but prescribed an entirely new reapportionment of the state's election districts as it -was constitutionally authorized to do); Smith v.
Board of Apportionment, 219 Ark. 611, 243 S.W.2d 755 (1951) (court ordered board to gre one
county an additional senator and drop one seat elsewhere); State ex re1. Herbert v. Bricker. 139
Ohio St. 499, 41 N.E. 2d 377 (1942) (board compelled by mandamus to reapportion); Show v.
Adkins, 202 Ark. 856, 153 S.W.2d 415 (1941) (court shifted seats in reapportionment). See People
ex rel. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E. 827 (1893), one of the earliest cases
in which a court ordered a board to reapportion the legislative districts of the state.
49 8 III. 2d 87, 132 N.E.2d 501 (1956).
50 Id. at 93, 132 N.E.2d at 506. Accord, Board of Supervisors v. Pratt, 47 Ariz. 536, 57 P.2d
1220 (1936).
51 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960).
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under the state and federal constitutions and to restrain the holding
of any primary or general election until a new statute was passed.
The court retained jurisdiction but gave the legislature one more
chance to act. However, its language was meaningful:
The judicial branch of the government has imposed upon
it the obligation of interpreting the Constitution and of
safeguarding the basic rights granted thereby to the people ....

But when legislative action exceeds the boundaries

of the authority delegated by the Constitution, and transgresses a sacred right guaranteed to a citizen, final decision
as to the invalidity of such action must rest exclusively
with the court. .

.

. However delicate that duty may be,

we52are not at liberty to surrender, or to ignore, or to waive
it.

The court also suggested that Colegrove was no roadblock to their
decision since that case did not involve the mandatory requirements of a state constitution. It would seem, however, that such
a distinction merely begs the question whether courts should enter
this "political arena" at all, regardless of which constitution is
involved.
II.

POSSIBLE MEASURES OF JUDICIAL RELIEF

The heart of the problem centers around the possibilities of
relief that our judicial system can logically and reasonably give.
Whether redress will be granted in any particular case, depends
upon the type of relief being sought. 53 However, providing that
the objections which were outlined in the first part of this paper
are overcome, the courts could grant the following types of relief:
(1) Mandamus the legislature. This will undoubtedly never be
done, since to do so would quite clearly infringe upon the delegated
powers of the legislature and violate the departmental scheme of
government. 54 (2) Judicially declare that an outdated act is unconstitutional and rely upon the legislature to reapportion. The
danger here is that the legislature might fail to act or might pass
an equally disproportionate act. In other words, such relief provides
no complete remedy. 55 (3) A court could declare an act invalid
and decree that until a new reapportionment act is passed, all elections be held on an "at-large" basis.56 This method can certainly
not be said to discriminate against certain groups; however, two
apparent criticisms of this relief are that by an indirect mandatory
52 Id. at 7, 161 A.2d at 710.
53 This fact is often overlooked by critics of the decisions which have denied relief. One
plaintiff categorized all of the apportionment cases in his brief in an attempt to show why most
of them were not precedent for the court to rely on, nhould they choose to deny him the particular
relief he sought, viz, have the present apportionment act declared unconstitutional and enjoin the
secretary of state from conducting an election pursuant to it. Brief for Plaintiff, pp. 36, 37, McGraw
v. Donovan, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958). Of course, the first question which a court must
decide is whether or not it wishes to enter such a " olt'cal arena."
54 State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo. 43 , 146 S.W. 40 (1912); People ex rrl. Wood',att
v. Thompson, 155 Il1. 451, 40 N.E. 307 (1895). See Comment, 17 La. L. Rev. 593, 616 (1957).
55 See, e.g., Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956), appeal dismissed, 352
U.S. 920 (1956).
56 Hume v. Mahan, I F. Supp. 142 (E.D.Ky. 1932), dismissed as moot, 287 U.S. 575 (1932) (dismissed because the case did not reach the Court until after the election-at-large had been h-ld);
Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Brown v. Scundcrs,
159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932). This method of relief (election-at-large) has been discred:ted by
a recent Massachusetts decision wherein the court stated that to order such " . . . could not be
o means of securing action at the session specified in the constitution." Lamson v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 168 N.E.2d 480 (Mass. 1960). In other words, such extraordinary relief does not
guarantee that the legislature will act - at least that was the Court's v:ew.
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injunction it forces the legislature to reapportion (assuming that
they would be dissatisfied with the status quo) and it might be
57
construed as a violation of the separation of powers. doctrine.
Nonetheless, this seems to be an effeztive remedy and one which
has already been approved by the Supreme Court. 58 (4) A court
might enjoin the holding of an election under the old apportionment statute and require the secretary of state to notify each election district of the correct number of candidates which it could
elect. This remedy would be appropriate only in states where such
a task was delegated to the Secretary of State. It was used by a
recent New Jersey court.5 9 (5) A court could compel non-legislative redistricting agencies in states where such agencies existed. 60
III. OTHER SOLUTIONS

Several state have attempted to reapportion by popular initiative action of the people, as is allowed in their constitutions. This
method, however, is far from being the panacea which it might
appear to be at first glance. In some instances the initiative is of
no value whatsoever. For example, in Missouri and Washington
successful initiative measures were nullified by subsequent amendments of the legislature. 61 In Massachusetts the initiative was declared inapplicable to apportionment problems.6 2 The Maryland
Constitution provides that there shall be submitted to the voters
every twenty years a proposal for a constitutional convention to
be called by the General Assembly if the voters approve. 63 In 1950
the voters overwhelmingly endorsed a convention, but the malapportioned assembly refused to call one for fear it might pass new
apportionment provisions. 64 The Colorado Constitution gives its
citizens the power of initiative action,6" and in 1932 this power was
57 See Comment, 17 La. L. Rev. 593, 616 (1957).
58 Smiley v. Holm, supra note 56.
59 Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, supra note 51.
60 Cases cited note 48 supro. See Tabor, The Gerrymandering of State and Federal Legislative
Districts, 16 Md. L. Rev. 277, 293 (1956).
61 See State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 130 S.W. 689 (1910); State ex rel.
O'Connell v. Meyers, 51 Wash. 2d 454, 319 P.2d 828 (1957) (Mandamus seeking to require use of
the initiative measure was denied).
Legislators Mangle Distriding Plan, 46 Nat'l Munic. Rev. 245
(1957).
62 In re Opinion of the Justices, 254 Mass. 617, 151
N.E. 680 (1926).
63 Md. Const. art. 14,
2.
64 Tabor, The Gerrymandering of State and Federal Legislative Districts, 16 Md. L. Rev. 292 (1956).
65 Colo. Const. art. 5, § 1.
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used to pass a new reapportionment act and repeal the old. Although attempts by the legislature to repeal the initiated act
failed,66 it should be borne in mind what a tremendous task such
initiative action requires. Strong political and moneyed interests
are always against such changes and these factors make a difficult
job almost impossible. 7
Other states have adopted or proposed constitutional provisions
which would take apportionment responsibilities away from the
political branch. The methods used in taking this responsibility
from the legislature vary. Some states have adopted or proposed
that special boards be given the power to reapportion.6 8 Other states
give or plan to give the duty to the secretary of state.6 In our two
70
newest states the duty of reapportionment lies with the governor.
The advantage of giving a "non-political" group the power to reapportion lies in the fact that a commission or board, whose sole
responsibility and purpose for being is to periodically reapportion,
can be compelled to perform by a writ of mandamus. 7' The same
can be said as to a secretary of state or a governor. On the other
hand, it is a fundamental concept that a court cannot compel the
legislature to pass legislation (although some have tried 72), even
though there is a constitutional mandate commanding the legislature to act. 73 The states which have reapportionment provisions

are fortunate. While the problem grows more acute in the remaining states, the possibility of legislative relief grows more remote.
Without federal intervention or relief from the courts it would
seem that the voters are remediless. It is too much to ask of most
legislators that they vote for a reapportionment scheme which
might cost them their job.
IV. A SPECIFIC PLAN
The methods for reapportionment proposed by Alaska and Hawaii were recently considered by the United States Senate. Senator
Joe Clark of Pennsylvania proposed that a Constitutional amendment be adopted providing that each state must reapportion its
legislature after every decennial census. 74 He also proposed a senate
bill outlining methods for implementing this amendment. Roughly,
the provisions of the proposed bill were:
1. A state must reapportion if the legislative representation
in either house of one district exceeds by fifty (50) per
cent the legislative representation in that house by any
other one district.
2. If the legislature fails to act within two years after the
census or if any action within that time is declared invalid by the courts, it shall then become the duty of the
66 Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Colo. 425, 37 P.2d 757 (1934).
67 For a discussion of the present situation in Colorado see Roos, Colorado Legislators Agree
Reopportionment Due, The Denver Post, Nov. 18, 1960, p. 26, col. 1; Roos, Three Counties in Denver
Area Entitled to Double Representation, The Denver Post, Nov. 10, 1960, p. 29, col. 1.
68 Ark. Const. amend. 23; Cal. Const. art. 4, § 6; Ill. Const. art. 4, § 8; Mich. Const. art. 5, § 4;
Mo. Const. art. 3, §1 7, 8 (for the senate); Ohio Const. art. 11, § 11; S.D. Const. art. 3, 1 5; Tex. Const.
art. 3, § 28. See generally, Lewis supra note 14, at 1089.
69 Ariz. Const. art. 4, pt. 2, § 1; Mo. Const. art. 3, §§ 2, 3 (for the lower house); Ore. Const. art.
4, § 6 (should the legislature fail to reapportion on schedule).
70 Alaska Const. art. 6, § 3, 8, 10; Hawaii Const. art. 3, § 4.
71 Cases cited note 48 supro.
72 Fergus v. Marks, 321 Ill. 510, 152 N.E. 557 (1926).
73 Cases cited notes 39, 54 supra.
74 106 Cong. Rec. 13827 (daily ed. June 29, 1960).
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governor of that state to establish a board of citizens
whose duty it shall be to submit a plan for reapportionment to the governor within ninety (90) days which
shall comply with the requirements.
3. Within one hundred-twenty (120) days following the establishment of such board the governor shall prescribe
by executive order such changes in territorial limits of
the election districts of the state and such changes in the
legislative representation in the state legislature as he
shall determine is required to bring the legislative representation of the state into the requirements.
4. If the above action has not been taken within three years
after the date in which the legislature should have acted,it becomes the right of any citizen of the state to bring
an action in the highest court of that state.
5. The court shall determine whether the present legislative apportionment act complies with the requirements
and if it does not, the governor may be compelled by
mandamus to provide the required apportionment.
6. The highest court in the state may also determine the
validity at any time of any legislative reapportionment
act or any promulgation by the governor, upon 75the appropriate suit being brought by a state citizen.
Instead of asking the state legislatures to ratify the proposed
constitutional amendment (which they would probably never do
since they now refuse to reapportion their own states), Senator
Clark proposed that the amendment be adopted in the states by a
constitutional convention held in each state solely for that purpose.
Delegates to the convention would be elected at large from throughout the state, as was done to repeal the twenty-first (prohibition)
amendment. This would allow the city and urban areas to elect
their proportionate share of the delegates and thus protect their
interests. It would seem that if the courts continue to refuse relief
in these matters such an amendment could become a very real
possibility. Increased litigation shows that there is a growing realization of
the nature of the problem by people in all parts of the
76
country.
CONCLUSION

Our judicial system has been hesitant to strike down apportionment acts which were valid when enacted, but became invalid due
to population shifts. This philosophy has to a great extent evolved
from the Colegrove decision. Until the last twenty years few litigants attempted to raise federal jurisdiction by asserting an act's
unconstitutionality under the fourteenth amendment. Perhaps the
reason for this is due to several factors. First, it has only been within the last twenty to thirty years that our states have experienced
a noticeable population shift within their borders. Second, in the
last decade our Supreme Court has strongly asserted its power over
75 Id. at 13835.
76 For a discussion of the problem in nationwide perspective see series of articles, Merry, The
Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 2, 6, 9, 13, 16, 1958.
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matters which were formerly viewed as belonging to the states,"
viz, that the segregation cases broke through the "political thicket"
first is due to the fact that traditionally segregation is a better
known issue and lends itself to more public sympathy. The American press has always been quick to publicize segregation issues,
but not until recently has much attention been devoted towards
portraying the voter whose vote is diluted by an old opportionment law.
The state legislative reapportionment problem becomes more
serious each year. Indeed, one writer has pointedly stated:
The effects of malaportionment are much graver today
than they were a century ago . . . the federal and state

governments spend a third of the national income . . .
[and] are relied upon to regulate every respect of a complex industrial civilization . . . The rapid growth of our

population and change in its character make even more
urgent the
need for regular, equitable adjustment of repre78
sentation.
Our courts could and should grant some remedy. No one can
deny that there is need for some type of relief when "the streams

of legislation . . . become poisoned at the source. 7' 9 It has always

been the rule that when a federally protected right is invaded the
federal courts will provide a remedy.80 Further, the mere fact that
a problem concerns a political right should not shield it from judicial review. 8' Federal jurisdiction can be based on Article 182 and
the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution.8 3 It is generally believed that the most appropriate relief which a federal
court could grant would be the striking down of the unconstitutional state apportionment acts. In conjunction with this relief the
court could enjoin the holding of any election under the invalid act
or order an election-at-large of the state's legislature. Such
forms
84
of relief are not beyond the power of a court to grant.
It is suggested that while the above forms of relief may be
entirely proper they do not provide remedies complete in all aspects.
The challenged act is only eliminated, not replaced. Indeed, it cannot be guaranteed that the state legislature will not pass another
act equally as offensive or fraught with injustice. Thus, while such
judicial relief may be entirely necessary or appropriate it does not
provide a fully satisfactory solution to the problem. The solution
lies only in a constitutional amendment such as that proposed by
Senator Clark. Only then could every voter be assured of preserving
a right which is constitutionally his.
77 Brown v. Board of Educat'on of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
78 Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1095 (1958).
79 Chafee, Congressional Reapportionment, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1016 (1929).
80 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Neal v. Delaware,
103 U.S. 370 (1880).
81 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Crunch 37) 137 (1803).
82 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
83 Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Sup*. 824 (D. Tenn. 1959), prob. juris. noted, 81 Supp. Ct. 230 (1960);
MaGraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901 (D. Minn. 1958), per curiam, 163 F. Supp. 184 (D. Minn. 1958).
84 Cases cited note 83 supra; Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe, supro
note 40.
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THE LAW AND MIGRANT AGRICULTURAL WORKERS
By HARLAN S. PARKINSON* AND KENNETH A. HARPERt

It is not to die or even die of hunger that makes a man
wretched. Many men have died. But it is to live miserably
and know not why, to work more and gain nothing, to be
heartworn, weary, yet isolated and unrelated.'
Approximately 2,000,000 citizens of the United States are engaged in migrant agricultural work, tending the rich soil that produces America's abundance of food and fibre. These citizens follow
the crops and the sun, nomads in an affluent society. They travel
thousands of miles over super highways lined with neon-lit restaurants, motels and night clubs. What do they have to show for this
journey? The answer for most of them is "119 days of farm employsearch for work-$710.00
ment, almost as many days of fruitless
'2
earned at farm work during the year."
One of the most evident results of migrancy is an almost complete lack of political power. State residence requirements for voting are difficult to meet, so votes by these people are rarely cast.
Consequently their voices are often muted by the more powerful
and vocal pressure groups in industry-organized agriculture and
labor. While business, agriculture, banking and labor are protected
in great part by federal and state legislation from the hazards of the
business cycle, weather, unemployment and conditions of the market, the migrant agricultural worker has little to safeguard his
interests. No federal minimum wage law sets a floor under his pay
scales or a ceiling over his working hours. There is no unemployment insurance when crops are bad, no child labor protection outside school hours and no right to bargain collectively.
This glaring social problem has existed since the early 1920's
when the first major farm depression in a quarter of a century
rocked the economy. Migrancy increased tremendously during the
1930's when the dust bowl and the depression combined to dispossess the "Okies" and "Arkies" we know so well from the pages of
Tobacco Road and The Grapes of Wrath. Today, caravans still rumble north from Texas, California and Florida, carrying the harvesters of the nation's food who are still being denied the protection
of laws enacted over the years to guarantee a modicum of security
for most groups in our society.
This article will trace the history of legislative and executive
actions to correct abuses in the area of domestic migrant agricultural labor 3 at both the federal and Colorado levels.
*

Member of Denver and Colorado Bar

Association; presently director, South American

Office

of the Wheat Market Development Service in Lima, Peru.
t Student, University of Denver College of Law.
1 3 Carlyle, The Modern Worker, ch. 13 (1843).
2 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, Economic Aspects of Farm Labor Migrancy
(1960) [hereinafter cited as U.S. Economic Aspect Report].
3 The American National intrastate and interstate agricultural work force, as distinguished from
the Mexican National or so-called "Brocero."
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FEDERAL MIGRATORY LABOR LEGISLATURE PROGRAM

Congressional Recognition of the Problem
There has been a long but almost totally unsuccessful history
of legislative attempts to deal with abuses existing in the area of
domestic migrant agricultural labor. The first recognition of the
problem at the congressional level came in 1936, when the Seventyfifth Congress created the LaFollette Subcommittee of the Senate
Subcommittee on Education and Labor. The purpose of the subcommittee was to investigate violations of the right of free speech
and assembly and undue interference with the right of agricultural

workers traveling in interstate commerce to bargain collectively.
From 1936 until the present time, more than two hundred bills relating to improving the lot of domestic migrant farm labor have
been introduced in Congress. 4 These legislative proposals fall into
the following general categories:
1. Extension of Social Security Provisions Relating to Old Age
and Survivors' Insurance (OASI). Proposals to include domestic
migrant farm workers within the protective scope of social security
began as early as 1937;5 however, success was not attained until
1954. At that time, Congress broadened OASI coverage to include
farm workers earning $100 or more from a single employer during
a calendar year. This was the first taste of victory for the proponents of migrant labor legislation. The taste quickly turned sour
in 1956 when Congress severely limited OASI coverage through
amendments increasing the annual earning requirement and redefining the term "employer" to effectively exclude the farmer hiring the migrants." The Department of Labor estimated that these
excluded some 250,000 farm workers from OASI coveramendments
age. 7 At the same time, the Social Security Act" was amended to
extend coverage to foreign agricultural workers. 9 Legislation was
introduced in 1959 to redefine "employer" to include the farmer
and to protect those already included through more exact record

requirements. 10 This attempt was unsuccessful.
2. Extension of the Wage and Hour Benefits of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The specific exclusion of agricultural workers from
the wage and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act has
resulted in a series of proposed amendments, beginning in 1939"
and continuing with annual regularity until the present.' 2 Senate
Bill 1122, introduced by Senator Harrison Williams, would establish for migrant workers a progressive minimum wage reaching
one dollar per hour after three years. 1 3 No proposal has yet been
enacted.
4 See Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service, Digest of Public General Bills, 75th Cong.

through 86th Cong.
5 H.R.,5807, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937); H.R. 8578, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1 937).
6Social Security Act § 105(a), 70 Stat. 807 (1956), 42 U.S.C. f409(h)(2) (1958); amending 49
Stat. 625 (1935); Social Security Act §105(b), 70 Stat. 807, 42 U.S.C. §410(o) (1958), amending 49 Stat.
625 (1935).
7 U.S. Dep't of Labor, Status of Agricultural Workers Under State and Federal Laws 5 (1959).
8 1104(c), 70 Stat. 807 (1956), U.S.C. §410(a)(1)(b) (1959), amending 49 Stat. 625 (1935).
9 1 United States Code Congressional and Administrative News 963, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
10 H.R. 11547. 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959).
11 S. 20008, S. 2220, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
12 S. 1122, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
13 The average hourly wage for all farm workers in 1959 was $.80, while that of the manufacturing worker was $2.15. U.S. Economic Aspect Report.
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3. Extension of Unemployment Benefits. Attempts have been made
through amendment of the Social Security Act to provide unemployment compensation to migrant farm workers. 1 4 All these attempts have been unsuccessful. As a result, farm labor is excluded
from coverage in every state except Hawaii. 15 However, as Hawaii
has a permanent (non-migrant) work force, the exclusion of16migrant farm labor from unemployment benefits is state-wide.
4. Extension of Child Labor Laws. Attempts were first made in
1941 to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act's (FLSA) provisions
7
Until
relating to child labor to include migrant farm children.
1949, however, all attempts at amendment were unsuccessful. In
that year, Congress extended the child labor protections to all children under sixteen engaged in interstate agricultural labor during
school hours.' However, a child below age sixteen, beyond the
hours of school, still suffers all the abuses associated with oppressive child labor; 19 moreover, the migrant laboring season is at its
peak during the summer vacation from schools. A companion proday-care facilities for the children of migrant
posal would establish
20
farm laborers.
5. Provision for Education. Until the present session of Congress, no
specific proposals relating to the education of migrant children have
been introduced. 2' Senate Bill 1124, introduced in the First Session
of the Eighty-seventh Congress, would establish grants in aid to
states who provide facilities for the education of migrant children
during the regular and summer school terms. A companion bill,
Senate Bill 1125, would establish adult education courses designed
to teach the migrant farm worker a trade to supplement his income
and, with the advent of farm mechanization, to prepare him for
employment in non-agricultural fields.
6. Health Legislation Coverage. Unsuccessful attempts have been
made to provide medical facilities for the use of migrants in or near
14 H.R. 6718, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); S. 3427, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
15 Suora note

5.

16The Bureau of Employment Security has found unemployment ranging as high as 40 percent
of the availablework farce in cotton areas. In 1959, form workers averaged 143 days of form
work. U.S. Economic Aspect Report.
iT S. 2057, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
2
63 Stat. 910, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 13(c)
I's Foir Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, §11(c),
(1958).
1pa Ibid. As amended. l213(c) provides that the provisions of the title relotrng to child labor shall
not apply as to ny employee employed in agriculure outside of school hours for the school district
in which he is living.
20 S. 1131, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
'21In 1940, H.R. 9528. 76th Cong.. 2d Sess.. recognized the need for such legislation, but mode
no specific proposals of significance.
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the areas of heavy migrant work. 22 Senator Douglas attracted attention to the deficiencies in this area when, during floor debate on
the Department of Interior appropriation, he offered an amendment
to transfer $500,000 from the general appropriation for the care of
migratory birds to the health, care and education of migratory
children.2 3 The amendment was ruled out of order. Recently a bill
to provide grants not to exceed $3,000,000 in any year, to the Surgeon General for improvement of the health24of domestic migratory
workers, has been introduced in the Senate.
7. Extension of the National Labor Relations Act. Any individual
employed as an agricultural laborer is specifically excluded from
the operation of the NLRA. 25 The first proposal to include farm
labor within the NLRA came from the LaFollette Subcommittee,
organized to study discrimination against migrants in interstate
commerce. 26 This proposal was 27not successful; however, further
proposals have been introduced.
8. TransportationMeasures. In 1956, the Interstate Commerce Act
was amended to allow the commission to establish a safety code
relating "to the transport of migrant agricultural workers in interstate commerce. ''28 The commission has adopted a comprehensive
safety code setting minimum standards of transport to insure the
safety and comfort of migrant workers in interstate commerce.
9. Restriction of Importation of Foreign Nationals For Agricultural
Employment. Public Law 7829 permits the importation of foreign
nationals for seasonal agricultural employment in the United States

to insure a sufficient supply of farm labor. The expiration date of
30
this law has been extended every year, from 1951 to the present.
A panel of consultants under the Department of Labor reported
that many abuses were ingrained in the administration of Public
Law 78. Wage levels were forced down and domestic workers were
frozen out of jobs in regions dominated by imported labor. Proposals to require employers to give preference
to domestic workers
3
have not been successful in Congress. '
10. Construction of Migrant Labor Camps. Proposals have been
made to establish migrant agricultural labor camps, or to transfer
existing camps to the Public Housing Authority for use by migrants.32 None of these measures have been enacted. Another approach recently introduced in Congress would provide long-term,
low-interest loans for the construction 33
of adequate housing facilities
for migrant workers and their families.
22 H.R. 10334, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); S. 1493, 78th Cong., 1st Sets. (1943).
23 Senotor Harrison Williams (D. N.J.) has had a similar experience with representatives of the
Farm Bureau of his state. This group informed the Senator that they were negative on his program
for migratory workers; but asked him if the Congress would appropriate $25000 to do something
about the blackbirds plaguing the crops in this country. Transcript of Senator Harrison A. Williams
and Charles B. Shuman on "Face the Nation" Debate: "The Migrant Farm Worker: Is Federal Legislation Necessary?" (March 9, 1961).
24 S. 1133, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
25 Labor Manaqement Relat:ons Act of 1947 §101(2)(3), 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1958).
26 S. 2860-64, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942).
27 S. 1128, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
28 S. 3391, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); Interstate Commerce Act §2, 70 Stat. 958 (1956), 49 U.S.C.
§304(a)(3a) (1958).
29S. 934, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); Agricultural Act of 1949 §501, 65 Stat. 119 (1951), 7
U.S.C. §1461 (1958).
30The House, on May 11, 1961 passed H.R. 2010 extending until December 31, 1963, without
change, the Mexican farm labor program. 24 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 988 (1961).
31 H.R. 1968, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
32 H.R. 4211, S. 1536, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 1247, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
33 S. 1127, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.(1961). A similar bill, H.R. 1247, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959),
was introduced in the previous sess:on.
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11. Registration of Contractors and Crew Leaders. Bills providing
for the registration and control of migrant labor contractors and
crew leaders have been introduced to cure the multitude of abuses
existing between the workers and their supervisors. 34 None of these
bills have been enacted.
12. Recruitment of Migrant Farm Workers. Several bills to allow
the Department of Labor to inform migrants of employment conditions in areas where work is to be found have been introduced
without success. 35 A recent bill would give the Secretary of Labor
broad powers to "recruit, transport and distribute agricultural
workers" in interstate commerce. 36 This measure would require the
employer to meet minimum standards relating to conditions of em34 S. 17778, H.R. 5930, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 11547, 86th Cong.,
S. 1126, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
35 H.R. 3856, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); 5. 1456, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
36 S. 1129, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).

2d Sess. (1960);
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ployment before being eligible to receive workers under the program. Other recent proposals would establish a National Citizens
Council on Migratory Labor to report conditions and make recommendations
to Congress and the President in the migrant labor
37
area.
II.

FEDERAL EXECUTIVE ACTION

By far the most effective action at the federal level to aid the
migrant worker was the Resettlement Administration, created by
executive order in the spring of 1935.38 The Resettlement Administration, later known as the Farm Security Administration, remains
the most successful federal effort in the migrant farm labor program. However, the effectiveness of this program in the field of
migratory labor was ended in 1946 when the provisions for (1) the
construction of sanitary camps for migrant families; (2) long-term,
low-cost loans to give the migrant and marginal farmer an opportunity to buy sufficient land to become self-supporting; and (3)
rural rehabilitation loans for the purchase of equipment, fertilizer
and stock were abolished or substantially weakened to the extent
that effective work was no longer possible.
Presidents Franklin Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower have
all organized "President's Committees of Migratory Labor." Although no effective results in the way of legislation or executive
action are directly attributable to these committees, an awareness
of the problem at the national level has been created and may bear
results in the future.
III.

COLORADO MIGRATORY LABOR PROGRAM

The domestic migratory worker may complain, on the state as
well as the national level, that of all the forgotten men in our
society "we are the forgottenest," and naively miss the point; on
the contrary, he has been the conscious object of deliberate and
skillfully drawn discrimination by a wide range of legislation and
administrative procedures. Historically, it has been the pattern of
state legislatures to exclude agricultural labor from the protection
of workmen's compensation and occupational disease laws,3 9 child
labor laws, 40 unemployment security benefits, 41 wage claim protection ,42 and the guarantee of the right of workers to organize and
bargain collectively. 43 This specific omission is due in Dart to the
absence of any economic or political influence asserted by this
submerged group upon their social bonds.44 Thus, it is apparent that
a strong public policy to exclude the migrant from social welfare
legislation early evolved into the legislative scheme on the levels
37 S. 1132, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
.38 Later incorporated in the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 50 Stat. 522 (1937), 7 U.S.C. §f
100.9-29 (1958).
39 Acviicultural labor excluded in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 81-2-6 (3) (1953).
40 "Nothing in this article shall be construed to prevent the employment of children in any fruit
orchard, garden, field or form ....
" Colo. Rev. Stat. § 80-8-1 (1953).
41 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 82-1-3 (e)(i) provides: "The term 'employment' shall not include: Agricultural
"
labor ....
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 80-12-1 to 3 (1953).
Farm labor is expressly excluded from the operation
of this statute in Colo. Rev. Stat, § 80-1-3 (3) (c) (1953).
43 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 80-5-2 (3) (1953).
44 Hearings on S. 1085, S. 2141, S. 1778 and S. 2498 before the Subcommittee on Migratory Labor
af the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, United States Senate, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 2 at
812 (1960). [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings on Migratory Labor].
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of both national and state government. This policy, perpetuated
under the influence of the state corporation farmer and the powerful grower associations, further engulfed the migrant-a pathetic
figure in our democratic society who has become commonly characterized as the landless farmer, the voteless citizen and the voiceless
stoic.
A. Initial Legislative History Concerning the
Migratory Worker in Colorado
The traditional national and state attitude towards the migrant
agricultural worker has been one of exclusion from the usual
protections afforded non-agricultural workers by our social welfare
legislation. Departure by the Colorado General Assemblies from
this philosophy has been a slow process. It is recent in origin and
certainly less than dynamic in
its impact upon the domestic mi45
grant work force in the state.

The first comprehensive study of migrant agricultural labor
problems in Colorado was conducted by a Governor's Survey Com46
mittee on Migratory Labor and the Child Labor League in 1950-51.
No further overall official study was pursued until 1958, when the
Governor appointed a migratory labor
committee comprised of
7
representatives of several state agencies.4
Legislative action pursuant to the recommendations advanced
by the 1950-51 Governor's Committee on Migratory Labor was proposed in 195l1, 4 in 1953,'4 9 and in 1955. 0 Briefly, this legislation proposed the creation of a Migratory Labor Board to prescribe and
administer health, education and safety programs for the migrant
worker. In none of the three sessions were the bills even printed.'
No legislative action relating to migratory labor problems was presented to the 1957 Colorado General Assembly other than an illfated amendment to the ill-fated House Bill 402 providing for revision of the Industrial Commission's regulation of wage payments
and wage claims. The proposed amendment was to include migrant
agricultural labor contractors and crew leaders under the revised
regulations. However, House Bill 202 passed in the House without
the amendment (and the bill itself) died in the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
45 The domestic agricultural work force is comprised of interstate (non-residents) and intrastate
(Colorado residents commuting within the state) migrants totaling roughly 10,000 during the late
season peak in 1959.
In addition, approximately 3000 Mexican Nationals ("Braceros") were used
in that year to complete the migratory farm labor. However, these totals are based on State Department of Employment estimates and do not include all workers and crews brought in by private
contractors or all crews and workers travelling independently.
See Colorado Legislative Council,
Report to the Colorado General Assembly: Migratory Labor in Colorado, Research Publication No. 43,
at p. X (1960) [hereinafter cited as Colorado Migratory Labor Report].
46Colorado Migratory Labor Report at p. IX.
The findings and recommendations of the committee are set forth in the Senate Hearings on Migratory Labor at 1499-1500.
47 This committee's functions were: "To consult with and advise the Governor and his staff
regarding migrant labor problems; to act as liaison on behalf of the Governor of the State of
Colorado with the President's Committee on Migratory Labor and with other State committees; to
plan suitable programs of action and assist in their execution."
Letter from Dr. Ruth Howard,
Department of Health, to Miss Gwen Geach, Chief, Field Service Branch, Bureau of Labor Standards,
U.S. Department of Labor, October 15, 1958, in Senate Hearings on Migratory Labor at 1499.

48 H.B. 137, 38th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (1951).
49 H.B. 401, 39th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (1953).

50 H.B. 114, 40th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (1955).
51 Senate Hearings on Migratory Labor at 1501.
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Forerunner of the first legislative breakthrough of corrective
legislation in the field of migratory farm labor was the introduction
of House Bill 103 in the 1959 session of the Colorado legislature.
This bill required crew leaders and labor contractors to keep payroll records and give wage statements to those migratory farm
workers under their control. This bill passed in the House, but was
indefinitely postponed by the Senate Agriculture Committee. However, House Bill 62, containing substantially the same provisions as
the defeated House Bill 103, was passed by the General Assembly
during the 1959 session. 52 Unfortunately, the act did not provide for
registration of crew leaders and contractors; nor did it contain any
other provisions to establish the central control necessary for effective administration of the act. The ineffectiveness of this legislation
is reflected in the 1960 Migratory
Labor Progress Report to the
53
Colorado General Assembly:
Although the Industrial Commission has carried out an
extensive information program and has attempted to contact labor contractors and crew leaders personally, only one
... has been found thus far, who is subject to the provisions
of House Bill 62....

While it appears that this legislation has fallen short
of accomplishing its purposes.., the Industrial Commission
is of the opinion that at least another year's experience is
necessary54 before a proper evaluation of House Bill 62 can

be made.

Thus, the initial ten-year history of the official migratory labor
committee studies and ensuing legislative action programs has been
informative but almost completely unproductive in alleviating the
problems facing migrant workers in the state. Perhaps an explanation can be drawn from the text of the comment memorandum of
the 1958 Colorado Committee on Migratory Labor submitted to the
Hearings before the United States Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor: 55
The Committee has tended to avoid taking any action
which might be construed as controversial. This policy has
been followed to avoid alienating groups within the State
whose cooperation is needed and to encourage improved
relationships with other states. 56
These study committees have, however, served a valuable purpose. They delimited local migrant labor problem areas and created
an awareness in the state at large of a need for legislative action.
B. Citizen's Action Committees and the 1961 Colorado
General Assembly
One of the most valuable by-products of an official governmental study into the domestic migratory worker's problems has
been the creation of local citizen's committees for legislative action.
These committees, comprised of labor, civic, legislative, religious
52 Colo. Sess. Laws 1960, ch. 52.
53 Colorado Migratory

Labor Report.

54 Id. at 18. The total registration under this act after the "one year's experience"
a resident Spanish-American labor contractor.
55 Senate Hearings on Migratory Labor at 1499-1535.
56 Id. at 1506.
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and welfare group representatives are organized in communities
such as Greeley, Boulder and Denver. Legislative proposals (four
in number, emanating from these committees were introduced in
the 1961 session of the Colorado General Assembly. Passage of
this legislation by the Forty-third General Assembly would have
represented a long step toward admission of the Colorado migrant
farm worker to first-class citizenship and a level of "parity," in
legal rights and dignity with his brothers and sisters in non-agricultural industries.
1. Senate Bill 281. A Bill Relating to the Transportation of
Migrant Agricultural Workers.57 Under existing laws, the domestic
migrant farm worker is protected in interstate transit only if motor
carriers transport the worker for a total distance of more than
seventy-five miles and such transport is across the boundary lines
of any state, the District of Columbia, or territory of the United
States.58 The joint federal and state administration of these regulations has proved ineffectual, according to the officials of the Interstate Commerce Commission.59 Compliance with the Commission
regulations in Colorado has been avoided by altering the method of
transportation-a shift to private buses, cars and station wagons.
A Colorado State Patrol official's report to the 1958 Colorado Migratory Labor Committee indicated contact with fifty-two trucks
transporting migrants in 1958, nine contacted in 1959 and only
three in 1960.60
It is generally recognized that the states should consider enactment of generally uniform legislation in substantial conformity with
Commerce Commission regulations. Senate Bill 281 would have
adequately complied in both respects. It attempted to establish a
minimal safety code for the operation of motor vehicles used in
transporting migrant farm workers, consonant with the federal
regulations. The bill provided for certain reasonable requirements
with respect to the comfort of passengers, qualifications of operators, and safety of operation and equipment. The safety code was to
be enforced and centrally controlled by inspection and certification
at state ports of entry. Generally, the bill was less ambitious than
57 At least six states now have laws or regulations establishing safety measures for vehicles
used in transporting migrant agricultural workers. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Status of Agricultural
Workers Under State and Federal Labor Laws 5 (1960).
58 S. 3391, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), approved as Pub. L. 939 on August 3, 1956.
59 Colorado Migratory Labor Report at 16.
60 Ibid.
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similar legislation passed in Oregon and California; 61 however, Bill

281 died on the floor of the Colorado Senate and has been tabled
indefinitely.
2. House Bill 414. A Bill Relating to Sanitary Conditions in
2
Migrant Agricultural Labor Camps and Places of Employment. "
An annual federal grant from the U.S. Children's Bureau, slightly
in excess of $40,000, has made medical services available to migrant
farmworkers in Colorado since 1955.63 This program is administered
by the Department of Health through its Maternal and Child Health
section. However, local health legislation extending protection to
the migratory labor camps for controlling sanitation and housing
conditions is not available. Apparently, the State Health Board
and Department of Health possess statutory authorization to promulgate and enforce minimum sanitation and housing standards
for migrant labor camps.6 4 There is some doubt, however, whether
compliance with health department regulations can be enforced
in view of the Colorado Supreme Court's 1959 decision in Casey v.
People.65 In Casey, the court held that a violation of a local county
health department regulation could not be made a misdemeanor;
that such offenses must be spelled out by statute and not derived
from regulations. However, House Bill 414 was not subject to the
same constitutional objection because the statutory standards for
minimum sanitation conditions in migrant labor camp and field
areas were specifically set forth in the bill. In addition, violation
of the sanitary code was not made a misdemeanor, but rather was
made a ground for refusal of issuance of a camp permit or revocation of such permit by a closing order to abate the public nuisance.
Provisions were inserted for appeal and judicial review to contest
the reasonableness vel non of either enforcement procedure.
Generally, House Bill 414 would have applied only to migrant
labor camps which were operated by persons engaged in the business of providing these facilities to the migrant and designed primarily to accommodate eight or more of these persons. The sanitation code provided for a safe supply of drinking water, toilet facilities, sewage and refuse disposal, and reasonably sanitary sleeping
areas. The necessity for these minimal health measures is manifest.
A 1951 Colorado study of 262 migrant families showed that half of
the families' living quarters consisted of one room; thirteen percent
had obviously unsafe water supplies; sixty percent had no bathing
facilities; eighty-six percent had not seen a doctor for the preceding
twelve months; only forty-two percent had received smallpox vaccinations; twenty percent received diphtheria and whooping cough
immunization; and only ten percent had tetanus immunization.
Infant mortality was twice as high in this group as the general
61 See Ore. Rev. Stat. 91 485.310-420 and § 485.990(2),(3) (1959). For California enactments see
Cal. Labor Code §§ 1682.3, 1684, 1696.2, 1696.3, 1696.4 and 1699.
62 Twenty-three states have general laws or regulations which seem applicable to migrant
agricultural labor camps. Op. cit. supra note 57, at 5.
63 Colorado Migratory Labor Report at 15.
64 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 66-1-8 (4) (1953) authorizes the State Board of Health to adopt rules and
regulations, to issue orders, and establish standards, which it deems necessary to administer and
enforce the public health laws of this state. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 66-1.7 (5) (1953) authorizes the
Department of Health to establish and enforce minimum general sanitary standards pertaining to
the quality of water supplied to the public and the quality of effluent sewerage systems. Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 66-1-7 (13) (1953) authorizes the Department of Health to establish and enforce sanitary
standards for the operation of industrial and labor camps. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 66-2-6 authorizes
local county health departments to carry out state laws and regulations.
65 139 Colo. 89, 336 P.2d 308 (1959).
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infant death rate for the state. One-third of the children born in
the preceding five years had not been attended by a doctor. 66
House Bill 414, designed to alleviate this unfortunate situation
in our state, was killed in the House of the Forty-third General
Assembly and has been postponed indefinitely.
3. House Bill 396. A Bill Relating to the Regulation of Migrant
Agricultural Labor Contractors and Crew Leaders.6 7 The evils
which House Bill 396 were designed to correct are perhaps best
summarized in this excerpt from the New York Times Magazine:
[One of the places they [migrants] need protection most
is to curb the rapacity of the unscrupulous among their
own crew leaders and labor contractors. These are the
middlemen who link migrant and grower in a hiring system
more susceptible to rackets than the outlawed shape up on
the New York-New Jersey waterfront.
The crew leaders yank themselves out of the migrant
stream by their own will to succeed. Too often their success is built on kickbacks, jacked-up prices for food and
liquor, and a monopoly over gambling, prostitution, and
marihuana ....

"I

A poignant illustration is one crew leader in Pennsylvania,
Raymond "Jacksonville Slim" Robison, who is Simon Legree, judge,
jury and company store to his crew of 135. He attempted to serve
also as prison guard until the FBI warned him that he could not
force people into human bondage. During a seven day work period,
Slim's crew earned $2,625. Of this sum, Slim's personal gross was
$1,750-leaving $875 to be distributed among his 135 workers for
the seven days' work. Through unlicensed dispensing of liquor and
food at the camp's only store, at prices twice the going rate, most
of the money earned by workers passed back to Slim. 69
House Bill 396 was designed to extend protection both to the
migrant farm worker and to the grower from the known abuses
practiced by unscrupulous crew leaders and labor contractors. A
certificate of registration and filing of certain employment information was required. A provision authorizing refusal to issue a certificate and suspension or revocation of the certificate for engaging
in undesirable practices 70 (upon notice and hearing) was inserted
to enforce compliance with the bill. A proviso for appeal from such
enforcement action was made through
provisions set forth in the
71
Colorado Industrial Commission Act.
House Bill 396 was introduced in the House, where it was
amended to such a degree during floor debate that the legislator
introducing the bill personally extended the motion to strike everything below the enacting clause. The motion was adopted and House
Bill 396 also has been postponed indefinitely.
66 Ssnate Hearings on Migratory Lalor at 1804.
67 Eight states and Puerto Rico have legislation specifically designed *for regulation of farm
labor contractors. Six of these, California, Nevada, Oregon, Puerto Rico, Texas and Washington
expressly require licenses, compliance with requirements relatinc tn records, restrictions against
certain undesirable practices and filing of bonds. Op. cit. supra note 57, at 4-5.
68 Raskin, For 500,000, Still Tobacco Road, N.Y. Times, April 24, 1960, § 6 (Magaz.ne), p. 14.
See generally, Senate Hearings on Migratory Labor at 958-60, 1481-89.
69 Pittsburg Post-Gazette, Sept. 5, 1960.
70 Misrepresentation in application for certificate, giving false information as to employment
terms and conditions to workers, coercing kickbacks from workers, and sponsoring gambling, prostitution, and sale of narcotics and liquor on premises under his control.
71 Colo. Rev. Stat. J§ 01-39 to 49 (1953).
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4. House Bill 410. A Bill Relating To The Education of Migrant
Children.72 This state's only significant migrant legislative development to date came with the passage of House Bill 410 in the 1961
session (discussed below).73 In 1957 the federal government offered
a three year migrant educational research grant of $36,100 to the
Colorado Department of Education. Colorado was selected for this
grant primarily because it was in the best position to administer
the project, as manifested by the state's interest in a number of
74
summer school programs operating prior to the date of grant.
Since 1955, the Colorado Department of Education has experimented with special summer sessions for migrant children, financed
from the contingency fund of the state public school fund. 75 This
was operated by local districts in the migrant areas. Six school
programs were operating during the summer of 1960, offering sixweek sessions in the Palisade, Rocky Ford, Wiggins, San Luis and
Monte Vista districts, and there was a five-week session in the Ft.
Lupton district. 76 A census of migrant children in Colorado was
made for the first time in 1959, indicating a total of 6,200. Out of
this number only 633 were enrolled during the regular school year.
Five of the districts engaging in the pilot migrant summer school
program have encouraged attendance of migrants during the regular session; however, as late as 1960, opposition was prevalent in
the Ft. Lupton district on the ground that teaching and school
facilities during the
regular session were not sufficient to include
77
migrant children.
House Bill 410 provides for the education of migrant children
during the regular session and for special summer sessions by those
school districts intending to make application to the State Board
of Education to participate in the program. 7 Classroom and supervisory formulas are specified to enable calculation of financial reimbursement to the district for the educational costs for each
migrant child. 79 During House debate on the bill, the provision
for enforcement against discrimination in admittance of migrant
children to local school districts was deleted from the bill. Therefore, the success of the migrant education program under this act
will largely depend upon the cooperation and spirit of local school
districts in the migrant areas.
Education is not a panacea for elimination of the undesirable
conditions facing the migrant; however, the introduction of a wellplanned, financially sound program for the education of migrant
children can only result in progress. Such a program is now possible in Colorado, assuming the cooperation of local school districts.
This program should go a long way toward eliminating academic
deficiencies and preparing the migrant for higher education or more
skilled occupations. Perhaps its most important ramification will
72 Oregon, Ohio, New Jersey, New York, Idaho and Pennsylvania have legislative provisions for
education of migrant children. Senate Hearings on Migratory Labor at 1521.
73 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 223.
74 Colorado Migratory Labor Report at 13.
75 Id. at xi.
76 Id. This six-district project provided educational opportunities for 554 migront children during
the summer of 1959 and 700 in 1960.
77 School districts could also deny admittance to migrant children under the school residency
requirements set forth in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 123-10-22 (1953). However, § 5(a) of H.B. 410 eliminates
this problem by defining the residence for school purposes to be the school district where the migrant
child is receiving shelter and the necessities of life.
78 Colo. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 223, § 4 (2).
79 Id. at § 6.
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be that of establishing a sense of acceptance-of belonging to the
human race.
C. Summary
The 1958 Committee on Migratory Labor's single specific recommendation to the Forty-third General Assembly was that a joint
resolution be passed to continue migratory labor study. 0 This continued study program is presently being conducted with field and
regional meetings in the five areas of the state where the greatest
number of migrant workers are employed.
The people of the State of Colorado enjoy the benefits of an
American standard of living, with practical abolishment of illiteracy
and graduation from high school commonplace for every young
American. However, there is no need for self-congratulation when
a sizable segment of our population continues to lack many of the
advantages which we now take for granted. A review of the legislative and migrant study programs discussed in this article leads
one to conclude that a combination of the present rate of progress
and the advent of agricultural automation s' will precipitate the
elimination of the migrant before the elimination of the migrant's
problems.
CONCLUSION

The domestic migratory farm worker is devoid of the political,
economic and educational resources to improve his fortunes by his
80 Colorado Migratory Labor Report at 37.
81 Id. at 9. Form mechanization in the harvest of sugar beets, certain vegetables
has been
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own initiative. The present policy of local and federal governments
is bottomed on the unfortunate combination of abysmal welfare
standards and the potent political strength of a few who stand to
lose by the improvement of the migrant's status. Only in the special
circumstance, such as the Public Law 78 "Bracero" or Mexican
National Program, is there federal protection for the migrant
worker. Ironically, this program for protecting the foreign national
migrant has only compounded the domestic migrant's plight by
creating more unemployment and depressed wage scales. The floodgates of foreign farm laborers opened under the wartime stress of
World War II and have remained open.8 2 The whole program has
been 8said
to function like a transplant from "Alice in Wonder3
land."
A consideration of the problems enumerated in this article indicates that migratory laborers and their families, citizens of the
United States, do not enjoy the human rights and privileges which
the General Assembly of the United Nations has declared should
be a common standard of achievement for all nations and all peoples. 4 The prevalence of repressive, rather than progressive, legislation on both the federal and state levels is the aggregate product
of a vast supply of cheap imported labor and the application of
agricultural laissez faire policies in the fields of labor and socioeconomic legislation. This is further complicated by the dreaded
affliction labeled "cenatophobia"-the mortal fear of anything new.
Passage of the twelve-point federal program discussed in this
article and revival and passage of the bills presented to the Fortythird General Assembly of the State of Colorado would at least
afford a catalyst from which could flow many benefits of resurgent
resources-not the least of which would be the achievement of
social justice and ethical human relationships.
The reader will, of course, evaluate and answer the migrant
farmworker problem on the basis of his own system of values;
but for our part, we would adopt the answer extended by former
Secretary of Labor Mitchell:
The migrant problem will not be ignored, nor can
people be led to ignore it. Our community will find ways to
solve it, and by community I mean the community of
citizens that make up America, citizens with wisdom and
compassion and good sense, and citizens who save their
final censure for those who stand by and seem unable to
find within their economy a place for conscience. 85
82 In 1942, the total number of foreign workers admitted into the United States was 4,203; in
1959, more than a decade after the cessation of World War II hostilities, the total was 455,858.
U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, Farm Labor Service and Office of Program
Review and Analysis, Form Labor Market Development 15 (1960). Thus, if numbers were the only
controlling factor, substantiation is afforded for the pronouncement of a placard over the Brocero
sleeping quarters in Stockton, California: "Future Farmers of America." Senate Hearings an Migratory
Labor at 1118.
83 In that, (1) its purpose is said to be to confine the Bracero workers to crops deemed essential
by the Secretary of Agriculture, and (2) the Secretary of Agriculture has declared no commodities
non-essential, with the result that approximately sixty percent of the Braceros work on crops in
surplus supply - a surplus upon which the taxpayer is being charged millions of dollars for storage.
N.Y. Times, April 24, 1960, § 6 (Magazine), p. 129, col. 2.
84 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 declares that everyone is entitled to the
rights and freedom of this declaration, without the distinction of race, creed, origin or other status.
Everyone has the right to work, to fre, choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of
work and to protection against unemployment; to form and join trade unions for the protection of
his interests; and to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
his family. Articles 2, 23, and 25, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Yearbook of the United
Nations (1948-49).
85 Supra note 83.
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CASE COMMENTS
EMINENT DOMAIN - HEALTH - STATUTES
Petitioners owned property in an area which had been designated as slum and blighted by the Denver Urban Renewal Authority. The Authority proposed to acquire much of the area by
either condemnation or purchase and then resell the acquired
properties to private interests to redevelop for commercial, residential or industrial use, in accordance with the Urban Renewal
Law.1 In an original proceeding, the Colorado Supreme Court held
that the Urban Renewal Law was constitutional and did not authorize the acquisition of private property for private use. Rabinoff v.
District Court, 360 P. 2d 114 (Colo. 1961).
The holding in the principal case is in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority. Urban redevelopment laws 2 have
been enacted in over half the states, and have been upheld in one
form or another, in all but two states.
Urban redevelopment has been most frequently attacked on
the ground that it permits the taking of private property for private
use and is, therefore, unconstitutional. The courts have had little
difficulty in disposing of this argument. It has been repeatedly
held that the primary purpose of urban redevelopment is the
elimination of slum and blight. 4 The property is, therefore, being
acquired for public use, and the subsequent transfer of the property
to private
interests is ancillary and does not defeat the public use
5
involved.
It has been urged that slum clearance can be achieved through
measures less drastic than eminent domain, such as zoning, building
and health laws. The courts have rejected this argument, saying
that the determination of whether a public use is involved is a
judicial question, but the selection of the means by which slum
clearance is to be accomplished is strictly within the province of
the legislature. 6
Once it has been determined that the taking of the property is
for public use, the argument that urban redevelopment allows
7
public funds to be used for private purposes obviously falls.
Another popular and equally unavailing attack on urban redevelopment has been that it constitutes an unlawful delegation of
authority from the legislature to the redevelopment agency. This
argument has rarely been upheld. 8 If the statute lays down basic
standards for the determination of slum and blighted areas and a
reasonably definite policy for the administration of the law, it
generally will not be declared to be an unlawful delegation of
I

Colo. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 58 at 289.

2 Urban redevelopment has been described as "a plan for the redevelopment, for all types of
uses, of areas suffering from blight or decay, through a program of co-operation between government and private enterprise. The former contributes its power of eminent domain to assemble the
needed parcels of land . . . The actual redevelopment is performed by private enterprise." Brown,
Urban Redevelopment, 29 B.U.L. Rev. 321 (1949).

3 Rabinoff v. District Court, 360 P.2d 114, 120 (Colo. 1961).
4 Schneider

v. District of Columbia,

117 F. Supp.

705 (D.D.C.

1953),

348 U.S. 26 (1954); Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn.
Foeller v. Housing of Portland, 198 Ore. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953).
5 Ibid.

aff'd, Berman

v.

Parker,

135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954);

6 Hunter v. Norfolk Redevelopment and Housing Agency, 195 Va. 326, 98 S.E.2d 893 (1953):
7 See 44 A.L.R.2d 1431 (1955).
8 Id. at 1427.
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authority.9 The courts, in construing these statutes, have taken
into consideration the fact that it is impossible to set up standards
for slum and blighted areas with mathematical preciseness. 10 Also,
the courts have been less strict in requiring specific standards in
these laws since they are closely related to public welfare. The
result is that the typical urban redevelopment law is rather broad
and general, and the finding of the agency as to what areas may
be selected for redevelopment is conclusive, unless clearly fraudulent or capricious.
There is little agreement among the courts as to the nature
and conditions of the areas which may properly be the subject of
redevolpment. Some courts have held that only slum or blighted
areas, insofar as they affect the public health and welfare, may be
taken. 2 Other decisions have allowed the acquisition of lands that
threaten to become slums or blighted.1 3 Areas characterized by
obsolete platting, faulty lot layout, deterioration of site and diversity of ownership may legally be the subject of redevelopment. 4
An area consisting of eighty-five percent vacant land was all owed
to be taken on the basis of "compelling economic need."15 In short,
the courts have run the gamut on this particular aspect of urban
redevelopment.
However, the courts are agreed upon the fact that urban redevelopment is to be conducted on an area basis. Thus, it generally
makes little difference that an area slated for redevelopment includes several structures which are not substandard. 16 It is the
area as a whole that governs the decision.
In only four states has the attack on urban redevelopment met
with any appreciable degree of success. South Carolina has flatly
declared urban redevelopment unconstitutional in that it permits
the taking of private property for private use.1 7 Georgia has held
it invalid for the same reason.' Subsequently, however, the Georgia
constitution was amended so as to allow such legislation. 9 Washington declared unconstitutional an act authorizing a port authority
to create industrial development districts by condemnation of
marginal lands which were being utilized for residential and agricultural purposes. 2 Involved here was not the typical urban redevelopment law designed to eliminate slum and blight. Rather, the
law was enacted to create attractive industrial sites. Florida has
indicated that urban redevelopment statutes and their proposed
anplications are to be carefully analyzed. Where the area is only
bliahted and is to be redeveloped for industrial use, and there is
little evidence that it is a menace to public health and welfare,
there is not sufficient public use involved to justify eminent domain proceedings. The defects can be adequately cured through
9 Velishka v. City of Nashua, 99 N.H. 161, 106 A.2d 571, 44 A.L.R.2d 1406 (1954).
10 Opinion to Governor, 76 R.I. 249, 69 A.2d 531 (1949).
I1 Alonel Corp. v. Indiana Redevelopment Comm'n, 154 N.E.2d 515 (Ind.1958).
12 Crommett v. City of Portland, 150 Me. 217, 107 A.2d 841 (1954).
13 People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City of Chicoqao,3 111.2d593, 121 N.E.2d 791 (1954).
14 Oliver v. City of Clairton, 374 Pa. 333, 98 A.2d 47 (1953). Contra, Randolph v. Wilmington
Housing Authority, 139 A.2d 476 (Del. 1958).
15 Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 CaI.App.2d 777, 266 P.2d 105 (1954). But See Beebe
Improvement Co. v. City of New York, 129 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1954).
16 Kaskel v. Impelliteri, 306 N.Y. 73, 115 N.E.2d 659 (1953).
17 Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956).
18 Housing Authority v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953).
19 Bailey v. Housing Authority, 214 Ga. 790, 107 S.E.2d 812 (1959).
20 Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash.2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959).
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the use of existing health, building and zoning laws. 21 But where
the area is clearly a slum and is to be converted
into a residential
22
area, the use of eminent domain is justified.
There is little doubt that desirable results have been achieved
by the judicial decisions declaring urban redevelopment to be valid.
The need for it is great, and it can be a very useful tool if used
wisely. The application of these laws is fraught with obvious difficulties. Especially difficult is the determination of what areas may
properly be redeveloped. It is impossible to set up rigid points of
demarcation in regard to this particular problem, and the existing
decisions indicate that, in most instances, any doubts are to be resolved in favor of the redevelopment agency, not the property
owner. There is a constant danger that needless harm and suffering
will be wrought by an abuse of authority or a lenient court.
Robert Holt
21 Adams v. Housing Authority, 60 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1952).

22 Grubstein v. Urban Renewal Agency, 115 So.2d 745 (Fla.

1959).
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WITNESSES - COMPETENCY - HUSBAND AND WIFE
- COMPELLING TESTIMONY IN
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
James Ivey Wyatt was convicted in a federal district court for
knowingly transporting a woman in interstate commerce for the
purpose of prostitution in violation of the White Slave Traffic Act.'
Subsequent to the date of the offense but prior to the trial, he
married the victim. At the trial the prosecution called his wife as a
witness against him, but she claimed the privilege of not testifying
against her husband. Over objection the trial court compelled her to
testify. Held, a prosecution under the Mann Act constituted an
exception to the common law rule ordinarily permitting a party to
exclude the adverse testimony of his or her spouse, and in such a
prosecution the witness, who was both victim and defendant's wife,
could be compelled to testify against him. Wyatt v. United States,
362 U.S. 525 (1960).
Before considering the admissibility of the wife's testimony, it
is necessary to distinguish between the general privilege prohibiting
testimony by one spouse against the other, and the special privilege
as to confidential communications. The latter seems widely recognized and approved in this country 2 while the former, although
recognized except where modified by statutes or limited by exceptions,3 has been strongly criticized because of its obscure origin,
uncertain rationale,
and unfortunate results in limiting the judicial
4
search for truth.
The federal courts have consistently applied the common law
rule that neither spouse may testify against the other where one is
accused of a crime. 5 Therefore, in Stein v. Bowman,6 one of the
earliest Supreme Court decisions, where the wife was called as a
witness to prove that her husband had committed perjury, the
Court stated, inter alia, that neither husband nor wife could be a
witness for or against the other; that this rule was subject to some
exceptions as where one spouse commits an offense against the
other;7 and that this rule rested upon considerations of family
peace.
The Court's position in Stein v. Bowman was reaffirmed and
received further support in Graves v. United States.8 However, in
Funk v. United States 9 the Court held that in a federal court the
wife of the defendant on trial for a criminal offense was a competent witness in his behalf. The Court rested its decision on the
ground that the exclusion had been based on interest, and now that
the defendant was allowed to testify in his own behalf there was
no reason for refusing to permit his wife to also testify for him. 0
1 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
2 8 Wigrnore, Evidence 1§ 2332-2341 (3rd. ed. 1940).
3 Ibid.
4 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1007-08 (1943).
5 38 Va. L. Rev. 359, 368 (1952).
6 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 209 (1839).
7 Id. at 221.
8 150 U.S. 118 (1893).
9 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
10 Id. at 381.

NOVEMBER-DEcEMBER,

1961

DICTA

In a footnote to the principal case," the Court indicates the interpretation it has placed on the Funk case by saying: "Funk v. United
States, supra, abolished for the federal courts the disqualification or
incompetence of the spouse as a witness, thus establishing the admissibility of his or her testimony, and leaving the question one of
privilege only."1 2
In the process of adopting the common law rule of incompetency, which is now defined as a privilege, the federal courts also
adopted the exception known as "necessity.' 3 This exception embodies a class of cases which at common law was narrowly construed to be "personal
wrongs" done to the spouse, i.e., "crimes
1 4
against the other.

The narrow limits, within which the exception applied, have
been broadened by legislative action. In 1887, Congress made it
permissible for a spouse to testify in cases where the defendant
spouse was prosecuted in the federal courts for bigamy, polygamy,
or unlawful cohabitation. 5 In 1917, a statute aimed at preventing
the importation of aliens for immoral purposes was enacted, and the
testimony of either spouse against the other was made admissible
and competent in prosecutions thereunder. 6 In neither of these
legislative enactments was any mention made of compelling the
spouse to testify.
With the passage of the Mann Act 1 7 in 1910, making it a federal

offense to transport a female in interstate commerce for immoral
purposes, several cases involving the "necessity" exception arose.
Often in these cases the testimony of the female transported was
necessary for a conviction, and in many instances the female turned
out to be the defendant's wife.
In one of the first cases to arise, Johnson v. United States,"8
the court held that a violation of the Act was not such a "personal
wrong" against the wife as would bring the testimony within the
exception.' 9 At approximately the same time as the Johnson case,
the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, in deciding that violations
11 Wyatt v. Un~ted States, 362 U.S. 525, 528 n.4 (1960).
12 While the Funk case, supro note 9, specifically establishes only the competency of the spouse
to testify for the accused, this statement by the Court is indicative of the later view taken by the
federal courtsthat the question is no longer one of competency but of privilege.
13 8 Wigmore, op. cit. supra, note 3, § 2239.
14 Ibid.
15 28 U.S.C.; 633 (1946).
16 39 Stat. 878 (1917), reenacted as 66 Stat. 230, 8 U.S.C. §1328 (1952).
17 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
18 221 Fed. 250 (8thCir.1915).
19 174 F.2d 833 (8thCir 1949).

Trust The Moving and Storage Requiruments
Of Yourself and Your ClientsTo Men Who Understand Your Problems.
CONFER WITH DON JOHNSON

JOHNSON STORAGE & MOVING CO.
Affiliated With United Van Lines
221
Broadway

Pearl
Local and World-wide

3-2433

DICTA

NOVEMBER-DEcEMBER,

1961

of the Act were within the privilege, said that the term "personal
injury" was not confined to acts of personal violence, but might
include
torts against the wife or a serious moral wrong against
20
her.

The initial conflict between the Courts of Appeals of the 8th
and 9th Circuits presented an opportunity for the Supreme Court to
intervene, but it did not. Subsequently, the Courts of Appeals of
the 2nd Circuit,2 1 the 5th Circuit 2

2

the 10th Circuit, 23 and several

district courts 24 have supported the view that cases involving violations of the Mann Act were within the exception and have allowed
the wife to testify against her husband.
It is interesting to note that in every one of the cases the wife
has testified voluntarily, and the only objection interposed has been
that of the defendant-spouse. His privilege of excluding the adverse
testimony of his spouse fails because of the "necessity" exception.
The interesting question then arises: Does the marital witness also
have a privilege, to wit, refusing to testify?
In Hawkins v. United States, 25 the Government urged the Court
to rule that the privilege resided in the witness only. In refusing to
do so, the Court rejected any distinction between voluntary and
compelled testimony, and reaffirmed its position that where the
crime was not against the other spouse the defendant could exclude
his spouse's adverse testimony.2 6 This decision supports Professor
Wigmore's view that the
husband-wife privilege is a dual one, resid27
ing in both the spouses.

The law had reached this point when the principal case arose.
The Court specifically affirmed the view that in most instances the
privilege resides in both the party and the witness. 28 It also made
clear that it was not holding that in all cases where the party's
privilege is lost because of the "necessity" exception the witness'
privilege is also lost, but rather: "It is a question in each case, or
in each category of cases, whether, in light of the reason which has
led to a refusal to recognize
the party's privilege, the witness should
'29
be held compellable.

The Court, therefore, decided that in cases involving the Mann
Act, as a matter of public policy and in order to facilitate the legislative intent embodied in the act, the witness-wife would not be
allowed to voluntarily make the choice whether or not to testify
against her husband. It felt that a man who could influence a
woman to the extent that she would prostitute herself could also
influence her to the point where she would marry him and refuse
to testify against him. This same line of reasoning was applied to
20 Cohen v. United States, 214 Fed. 23, 29 (9th Cir. 1914).
21 United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
22 Denning v. United States, 247 Fed. 463 (5th Cir. 1918).
23 Hayes v. United States, 168 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948).
24 Wilhoit v. Hiatt, 60 F. Supp. 664 (M.D. Pa. 1945); United States v. Williams, 55 F. Supp. 375
(D. Minn. 1944).
25 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
26 There are three significant items in this case. First, the woman transported across state lines
was not, and did not become tho defendant's wife. Secondly, although there was some doubt, the
defendant's wife did not obiect to testifying. Thirdly, there was no evidence to show that the dedefendant had sexual relations with the transported female; hod there been, the Court might have
found that this was a crime against the wife and therefore within the exception.
27 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2241 (3rd ed. 1940).
28 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 529 (1960).
29 Ibid.
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the defendant's argument that there was no basis for the "necessity"
exception where the marriage occurred after the date of the offense.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in a dissenting opinion,30 concurred
with the majority's reasoning but disagreed with their conclusions.
He felt that there was no congressional support for the Court's decision, and that without it this decision represented an intrusion into
what was essentially a legislative area. He states: "It is more properly Congress' business, not ours, to place comparative values upon
the quest for facts in the judicial process as against the safe-guarding of the marriage relationship .... -31 The dissent also pointed out
that under section 132832 the testimony of 33the spouse is made admissible and competent, but not compulsory.
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure gives to
the federal courts the right to interpret the common law in the light
of "reason and experience." In the instant case, the Court did
exactly that. Finding little or no authority in either the common
law or congressional acts, the Court exercised its power in a very
limited area to reach a just and logical result. It is difficult to
conceive of a more vicious offense than that of inducing a woman
to prostitute herself for the benefit of another, and the crime takes
on an added repugnancy when the female is the wrong-doer's wife.
On the grounds of public policy and morality the decision in the
Wyatt case should receive approval as an effective method of curtailing these offenses.
George M. McClure III.

QUO WARRANTO
The unsuccessful candidates for offices in an unincorporated
labor union local asked the district attorney to bring an action
under the Rule of Civil Procedure' which abolishes the ancient writ
of quo warranto and allows a civil action against officers allegedly
elected through use of unfair election procedures and in violation of
the organization's constitution. When the district attorney refused
the unsuccessful candidates brought their own action as permitted
by the rule. Held: Judgment for defendants affirmed. The action
was not properly brought because quo warranto applies only to
public, not private, offices. People ex rel. Mijares v. Kniss, 357
P. 2d 352 (Colo. 1960).
Quo warranto is traditionally viewed as a proceeding to test
a party's right to a public office or franchise.2 It is an extraordinary

and highly prerogative writ,3 warranted only when a wrong against
30 With whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas joined.
31 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 535 (1960).
32 66 Stat. 230 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §1328 (1952).
33 Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 538 (1960).
1 Cala. R. Civ. P. 106(a)(3) provides: "Special forms of pleadings and writs in ...
quo warranto . . . are hereby abolished. In the following cases relief may be obtained by appropriate action
or by an appropriate motion under the practice prescribed in these rules:
"... (3) When any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises any office or
franchise. The district attorney . . . may . . . bring an action against such person in the name of the
people of the state, but if the district attorney declines so to do, it may be brought upon the relation and complaint of any person . . . . When such an action is brought against a defendant alleged
to usurp, intrude into, or unlawfully hold or exercise any public office, civil or, military, or any

franchise it shall be given precedence over other civil actions .... "
2 2 Spelling, Extraordinary Relief in Equity and At Law § 1765 (1893).
3 People ex rel. v. Blake, 128 Colo. 111,260 P.2d 592 (1953).
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the public appears. 4 When only a private interest reveals itself, the
action cannot be entertained. 5 The code section adopted by the
Colorado Legislature was interpreted at an early date as providing
a civil action 6to replace the common law proceeding formerly used
in such cases. That code section was the source of Rule 106 (a) (3)
when the rules were adopted in 1941.
Many cases have dealt with the issue of whether a position was
a public office or employment.7 While not deciding whether quo
warranto should lie to test a private office, they do illuminate
which offices can be tested. Essentials of a public office have been
stated as an office (1) created by the constitution, legislature, or
some other body by means of authority conferred upon it by the
legislature; (2) containing a delegation of a portion of the sovereign
power; (3) having duties defined by the legislature or by one
given authority to so define; (4) to be performed without control
by a body other than the legislature, unless the legislature has
created the position under the general control of a superior body;
and (5) having some permanence and continuity.8 The element
deemed to be most important in the definition of a public office is
that it must possess some portion of the sovereignty.9 Quo warranto
can cause a forfeiture of the franchise of a corporation'0 and can
also be used against an unincorporated body which is purporting to
exercise a franchise."
The Colorado Supreme Court found the action proper against
an invalid election of corporate officers on the theory that the
privileges conferred upon a private corporation are unlawfully
exercised whenever a person wrongfully undertakes to act as such
officer. 12 In England quo warranto will not lie to test the right to
a corporate office since the sovereign neither aids nor reserves any
3
control over it.'

All American courts except Massachusetts allow

14
such action in these instances.
In Nebraska an action was allowed against the head of the
English department of a state normal school, but only be.ause the
4 People ek ret. Weisbrod v. Lockhard, 26 Colo. App. 439, 143 Pac. 273 (1914).
5 People ex rel. Union Pacific Ry. v. Colorado E. Ry., 8 Colo. App. 301, 46 Pac. 219 (1896).
6 Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v. People ex rel. Att'y Gen., 5 Colo. 60 (1879).
7 People ex rel. Chapman v. Rapsey, 16 Cal.2d 636, 107 P.2d 388 (1940), where positions of
city judce and city attorney were public offices; State ex rel. Nagle v. Page, 98 Mont. 14, 37 P.2d
575 (1934), in whrh state boiler inspector was not a public officer; State ex eel. Gibson v. Fernandez, 40 N.M. 288, 58 P.2d 1197 (1936), where state tax attorney appointed by the state tax commission was not a public officer since all dut;es had been delegated to the state tax commission;
State ex. rel. Mathews v. Murray, 70 Nev. 116, 258 P.2d 982 (1953), in which director of driver's
license divis'on of the publ'c s.rvice commission was employment and not pu'ilic off:ce mainly because the statutes created public service commission but did not mention a driver's license division;
Ao'lication of Milwaukee Chapter, Izaak Walton League of America, 194 Wis. 37, 216 N.W. 493
(1927), wherein state conservation director was not n oublic officer.
8 State ex ref. Nagle v. Page, 98 Mont. 14, 37 P.2d 575 (1934).
9 State ex rel. Gibson v. Fernandez, 40 N.M. 288, 53 P.2d 1197 (1936).
10 Canon City Labor Club v. People ex rel., 21 Colo. App. 37, 121 Pac. 120 (1912), in which club
received franchise to operate as a social club but actually dispensed liquor in violation ef an ordinance.
11 People ex rel. Cory v. Colorado High School Activities Ass'n, 141 Colo. 382, 349 P.2d 381
(1960), wherein a type of franchise was found when, to be able to engage in interschool activities,
the school districts joined and paid public monies into this association which operated independently
of statutory authority.
12 Grant v. Elder, 64 Colo. 104, 170 Pac. 198 (1918). Here a conflict arose between two factions
of stockholders-each group claiming proxies held by the other. A dissenting opinion stated that
the majority did not take notice that other states that had allowed an action against a corporate
officer had done so because of a statutory provision, while the Colorado code could not be so Interpreted. Then, in Wolford v. Bankers Sec. Life Ca., 91 Colo. 532, 17 P.2d 298 (1932), Mr. Justice
Butler, while upholding the rule of Grant v. Elder, remarked that he, when presiding at the trial of
Grant v. Elder as district court judge, had been much impressed by the line of argument expressed in
that dissent, but that, nevertheless, the case had been the law for fifteen years and the court should
not then deport from it.
13 Ferris, Extraordinary Legal Remedies § 154 (1926).
14 Ibid.
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statute had considerably extended the scope of quo warranto to test
any office. 15 The court said it would ordinarily seem to cover "any
position where authority is coupled with duty and where duty is
for a public purpose. '"16

Since quo warranto lies even against a person or corporation
claiming and exercising privileges of a public nature without legislative authority, the Florida Supreme Court found it would also lie
against a nominee for public office because statutes of that state
bestowed upon the nominee 1 certain
privileges, such as the exclusive
7
right to a place on the ballot.

In Georgia the action has also been used successfully to test
the right of a person to exercise the political party office of state
Democratic executive committee chairman.' 8 Although it was expressly found to be a private office, an analogy was drawn to private corporate offices. So the action would also lie where the legislature had imposed upon the chairman of a state committee of any
political party certain specified duties, thus giving the office a
status equivalent to the office in a private corporation. 9 However,
most courts have not extended the doctrine to this extreme.2 0
By contending in the instant case that the rule should allow
a civil action against a private officer, the relators created a case of
first impression. In comparing the political party nominee and
officer with a labor union officer, is there imposed upon the latter
any duty or privilege? In Colorado the legislature has stated that
the policy of the Labor Peace Act is to recognize interests of the
public, the employee, and the employer, and that members of labor
organizations have the right to elect officers by secret ballot.2 1 But
the supreme court has held that provisions requiring labor unions to
incorporate were unconstitutional, because rights of free speech,
press and assembly were removed. 22 While the recent Landrum15 Eason v. Majors, 11 Neb. 288, 196 N.W. 133 (1923).
16 Hf. at 133.
17 State ex rel.Watkins v. Fernandez, 106 Fla.779, 143 So. 638 (1932). The court said, at page
640, "There is noth'ng soncrosanct or mvstical about a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto.
It is subiect to like canons of common sense application as the other ancient prerogative writs. The
acid trst determ'native of whether or not it will relieve against the exercise of privileges claimed
to be established as matters of publici juris by statute is found in the answer to these questions: (1)
Has the Legislature prohibited its exercise by citizens generally, ether with or without condition?
and, if it has, (2) Were the evils in-view as a reason for the prohibition of a public or private
chcracter?"
IS Morris v. Peters, 203 Go. 350, 46 S.E.2d 729 (1948). Statutes had imposed upon the chairman
of any state political party commttee the duty to consolidate and publish the results of primary in
a newspaper, see that candidates' names were on the ballot, file a c'rtificcte of the primary votes
with the secretary of state, and receive and publsh the reports of recount committees. In Ritchie v.
Barker, 216 Ga. 194, 115 S.E.2d 539 (1960), the court followed Morris and found similar statutory
duties imposed upon members of a county Democrat:c executive committee.
19 Ibid.
10 Stout v. Democratic County Cent. Comm., 40 Cal.2d 91, 251 P.2d 321 (1952); People ex rel.
Brundage v. Brady, 322 III. 576, 135 N.E. 87 (1922); Attorney Gen. v. Drohan, 169 Mass. 534, 48
N.E. 279 (1897).
21 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 80-5-1 (1953) provides: "The public policy of the state as to employment relations and collective bargaining, in the furtherance of which this article is enacted, is declared to
be as follows:
"(1) It recognizes that there are three major interests involved, namely: That of the public, the
employee, and the employer. These three interests are to a considerable extent interrelated. It is
the policy of the state to protect and promote each of these interests with due regard to the situation
and to the rights of others .....
"(4) All rights of persons to join labor organizations or unions and their rights and rivileges
as members thereof, should be recognized, safeguarded and protected. No person shall be denied
membership in a labor organization or union on account of race, color, religion, sex or by any unfair
or unjust discrimination. Arbitrary or excessive initiation fees and dues shall not be required, nor
shall excessive, unwarranted, arbitrary or oppressive fines, penalties, or forfeitures be imposed. The
members are entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers, agents or representatives of ell
financial transactions and shall have the right to elect officers, by secret ballot and to determine and
vote upon the question of str:king, not striking, and other questions of policy affecting the entire
membership."
22 AFI. v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 90, 155 P.2d 145 (1945).
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Griffin Act imposes obligations upon union officers for internal

affairs and states certain minimum election requirements, 23 the
Colorado statutes provide for none of these.
The Landrum-Griffin Act provides a remedy after the internal
processes of the union have been exhausted. 24 The only other remedy found was in a few cases where equity had entertained questions arising from labor union elections on the basis of the important economic interest (i.e., a25 property right) which a member has
in the person selected to lead.
Since, by statute,2 6 the court cannot formulate rules of procedure in such a way as to enlarge the substantive rights of the
litigants, it is not surprising that quo warranto will not lie here
against a labor union officer as long as his organization is unincorporated. Cases of the political party officers and nominees are of
little aid in this situation, since they carry the flavor of a public
office. Indeed, in the South, the nominee from the Democratic party
is very likely to become the public officer.
The public has been interested in labor-management relations
for some time, but only recently has it turned to look toward the
internal labor organization. It was found that membership in a
union was really not voluntary. The union had become the bread
winner. It was also found that union democracy was sometimes
lacking, but there was no remedy except in a few cases where
equity could be shown a property right.2 7 If quo warranto will not
work, a party will have to resort to the Landrum-Griffin Act where
he may find a satisfactory answer.
Marshall Dee Biesterfeld
23 Labor Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959 § 104, 73 Stat. 523, 29 U.S.C. § 414
(Supp. I, 1959), requires that the secretary of each labor organization must deliver a copy of each
collective bargaining agreement to any employee requesting it; § 201, 73 Stat. 524, 29 U.S.C. § 431
(Supp. I, 1959), requires that the constitution, the bylaws, a report on several aspects of the internal
procedures, and an annual financial report be filed with the Secretary of Labor and that the same
information be available to the m-mbers; and § 401, 73 Stat.532, 29 U.S.C. § 481 (Supp. 1, 1959),
requires an election of national officers at least every five years and local officers at least every
three years by secret ballot, It also requires no discrimination between candidates by the present
officers and includes adequate election safeguards, including the preservation of ballots for one year.
24 Labor Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959 § 420, 73 Stat. 534, 29 U.S.C. § 482
(Supp. I, 1959) provides:
"A member of a labor organization-(1) who has exhausted the remedies available . . . or
(2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a final decision . . . may file a
complaint with the Secretary . . . alleging the violation of any provision of section 481 of this
title (including violation of the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization pertaining to the
election and removal of officers) ....
"The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he finds probable cause to believe
that a violation of this subchapter has occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, ...
bring a civil action against the labor organization ....
25 Bianco v. Eisen, 190 M;sc. 609, 75 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Supp. Ct. 1944); Dusing v. Nuzzo, 177 Misc.
35, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
26 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-2-8 (1953) provides:
. . . Such rules shall neither abridge, enlarge,
nor modify the substantive rights of any litigants .
"
27 Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 609 (1959).
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VEHICLE TRAFFIC LAW. By Edward C. Fisher. Evanston, Illinois:
Traffic Institute, Northwestern University, 1961. Pp. 468. $10.
More Americans are affected each year by our traffic laws and
regulations than all other city and state laws combined. However,
authoritative aids in interpreting and understanding the nation's
traffic laws are sparse.
Vehicle Traffic Law by Edward C. Fisher, associate counsel of
the Traffic Institute, and former judge of the Municipal Court of
Lincoln, Nebraska, is the first complete treatise covering a thorough
digest and review of existing traffic laws and regulations. In no
other one-volume work can one find ready references, precedents,
and case citations interpreting the provisions of the uniform vehicle
code. The code, with local variations, forms the great body of traffic
laws and regulations throughout the country.
Judge Fisher is all too modest when he states in the preface,
"This book represents an effort to present the subject of vehicle
regulation through legislative action and judicial interpretation.
The aim has been to place these in proper perspective, emphasizing
their purpose and place against a background of progress in the
American way of transportation and movement by vehicles as
controlling forces in our society and mode of life."
This book accomplishes much more than the stated aim and
purposes of the author. It provides a clear and lucid, but authoritative, guide to the great number in our population who are called
upon to interpret and enforce our traffic laws. While setting forth
numerous references to other works and research materials, this
book is complete within itself and review of other materials is
scarcely necessary.
In authoring this book, Judge Fisher has filled a long-neglected
need in the legal profession. Vehicle Traffic Law is certain to become a keystone and commanding influence in legal and traffic
safety circles. The book will serve to dispel much of the uncertainty
and misunderstandings existing in the minds of motorists, but more
especially, judges and attorneys, as well as enforcement officers,
with respect to the application and true meaning of our traffic regulations. Not only in criminal prosecutions for violations of traffic
laws is this book useful, but those interested in civil litigation and
accident causation and liability will find it to be of extreme value.
Our legislators, in particular, will benefit from its publication and
will be afforded an excellent working tool to discharge their lifesaving responsibilities in promulgating workable, equitable and
constitutional traffic laws. To the average reader, the book will
prove informative and interesting.
The technique utilized by the author makes the review of
traffic laws and court decisions all the more meaningful. The first
five chapters cover the background, development, purpose of, and
necessity for traffic laws. The remaining fifteen chapters contain
a complete treatment of the legal and constitutional aspects of
traffic engineering, legislative enactments, enforcement, licensing
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and revocation of licenses, jurisdiction, prosecution, penalization
and punishment of traffic offenses. Judge Fisher has included in his
book every conceivable phase of our existing traffic laws and regulations. The readable index prompts quick reference.
The author does not pretend to present philosophical or abstract
complexities of traffic safety; but instead, he has written a workable practitioner's manual.
Serving as a municipal judge of Lincoln, Nebraska for fourteen years and as Associate Counsel of the Traffic Institute, Northwestern University, for over ten years, Judge Fisher is eminently
qualified to author this far-reaching treatise. He has written other
books and articles on related subjects. In this most recent work, he
has displayed a keen insight into legal, procedural, and constitutional problems faced daily by persons actively concerned with the
various aspects of traffic supervision, licensing, enforcement and
control.
Vehicle Traffic Law, eight years in preparation, reflects the
articulate product of a truly outstanding and dedicated student of
the law. From a casual reading, it is apparent that Judge Fisher
possesses one of the keenest legal minds in this field in the country
today. Trained or untrained, the reader will find this book an aid
in understanding the many traffic laws governing the great field
of human activity-driving. I commend Vehicle Traffic Law highly.
Sherman G. Finesilver*

COLORADO NEGLIGENCE DIGEST. By Richard D. Hall.' 1961.
Pp. 129. $10.30.2
This book is a revised successor to Mr. Hall's Colorado Accident
Law Digest published in 1950 (now out of print). Your reviewer
had the pleasure of writing a book review of the 1950 work 3 and
there had nothing but high praise for the original book. The new
work is even better than its predecessor.
The author has digested all of the Colorado negligence cases
reported since 1919, and some selected negligence cases decided
prior to that date. In classifying the cases, he has again used what
may be described as the "functional approach," i.e., grouping the
,cases by fact patterns. For instance, Chapter I, entitled "Negligent
Operation of Motor Vehicles," is divided into eight subchapters,
based upon the fact patterns of accidents. To illustrate: three of
:such subchapters are entitled "Two Car-Rear End," "Two carLeft Turn" and "Two Car-Head On."
The book contains eight chapters of classified negligence cases,
three appendices and a table of cases. The digests of the cases are
very brief. The obvious intention of the author is to save the time
of the researcher.
* Judge of the Municipal Court, Denver, Colorado.
I Member of the Denver law firm of Yegge, Hall & Shulenberg.
2 University of Denver Bookstore, 1825 South York, Denver 10, Colorado.
3 28 DICTA 118 (March, 1951).
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Important also is the author's statement in his preface that the
Digest will be kept up to date by biannual supplement sheets.
Willson Hurt*

BOOKS RECEIVED
1. Advocacy and the King's English. Edited by George Rossman.
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1960. 976 pages, $12.50. A collection
of treatises on the use of the English language by members of
the legal profession.
2. The Art of Thinking. By Dagobert D. Runes. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1961. 90 pages, $2.75. An analytical examination of the role emotional elements play in the formulation of
logical propositions.
3. Expulsion or Oppression of Business Associates. Prepared by
Duke University under the Small Business Administration Management Research Grant Program. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1961. 263 pages, $10.00. A practical guide to squeeze-out
avoidance and dispute settlement for small business, pointing out
the tendencies and threats to enterprises of multiple ownership.
4. The Federalist. By Gottfried Dietze. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1960. 378 pages, $6.50. Analysis of the political philosophies
of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay as presented in the Federalist.
Papers.
5. Legal Aspects of Business Administration (second edition). By
Dow Votaw. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961.
855 pages, $12.00. A treatment of legal problems encountered by
the businessman; supplemented by business case material based
on actual legal problems.
6. The Probation Officer Investigates. By Paul W. Keve. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, 1960. 178 pages, $4.50. A
guide to the preparation of the pre-sentence report.
7. Trial by Newspaper. By Harold W. Sullivan. Hyannis, Mass.: The
Patriot Press, 1961. 250 pages, $5.00. A presentation of the question
of the influence of newspaper stories and editorials upon the
judiciary and juries.
Associate Professor, Un'vcrsity of Denver College of Low.
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BA]R BRIEFS
OPINION NO. 21
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF
THE COLORADO BAR ASSOCIATION
ADOPTED AUGUST 11, 1961
SYLLABUS
Persons associated in the same law firm may not ethically
charge separate fees as an estate fiduciary and attorney for their
respective services to the estate.
FACTS
A and B are members (or associates) of the same firm practicing law in Colorado. A client of the firm dies, leaving a will naming
A as executor, and A retains B as attorney for the estate. May
they ethically charge and receive both an executor's fee and an
attorney's fee in connection with the administration of this estate?
OPINION

In Doss v. Stevens (1899) 13 Colo. App. 535, 59 Pac. 67, our
court held that an administrator who is an attorney cannot be
allowed compensation for his professional services to an estate as
an attorney. The rule of law has never been altered. The court
quoted with approval an Illinois case (Willard v. Bassett, 27 Ill. 37)
stating unequivocally:
The-authorities are uniform that this (dual compensation)
should not be allowed, and every principle of sound policy
forbids it. ***To allow him to become his own client, and
charge for professional services for his own case, although
in a representative or trust capacity, would be holding out
inducements for professional men to seek such representative places to increase the professional business, which
would lead to most pernicious results. This is forbidden by
every sound principle of professional morality, as well
as by the policy of the law.
In Opinion 49 and 72 the American Bar Association Committee
has held:
The relations of partners in a law firm are such that neither
the firm nor any member or associate thereof may accept
any professional employment which any member of the
firm cannot properly accept.
Lawyer A cannot be his own client in these circumstances.
Consequently, A cannot be a client of his own firm to the extent
that the attorney-client relationship involves payment of attorney
fees to his own law firm by A as personal representative of an
estate for legal services to him as fiduciary by B.
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THE NEW DENVER DISTRICT COURT RULES:
THEIR APPLICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION*
By JOHN R. EVANS**

The new Denver District Court rules represent a significant
step forward in the administration of civil justice in our local courts.
On February 7, 1961, the judges of the second Judicial District
adopted "Rules of Practice" for the District Court of Denver County.
These rules were adopted as a result of considerable effort and work
by a group of distinguished and dedicated trial lawyers and trial
judges in the Denver area. These rules were approved by the
Colorado Supreme Court on March 16, 1961. They are effective as
of May 15, 1961. Presumably the rules will not be retroactive as to
cases filed with the court prior to May 15, 1961, or to any matters,
including motions, pending prior to May 15, 1961.
Judge Neil Horan, the presiding judge of the court, states that
these rules were adopted and approved in the hope that their strict
application would serve the litigating public by relieving the
congestion of the trial dockets in the Denver courts. The rules and
their intended implementation by the court sound a clear warning
to the practicing trial lawyer that the rules should be observed and
heeded. If the rules are followed and applied by the bar in the
spirit in which they were promulgated, they can spell the end of
frustration to the lawyer and the litigant alike.
Although many lawyers were unaware that local rules of the
Denver District Court had existed in the past, the new rules supplant those of February 7, 1942. .The court has indicated that the
new rules, unlike the old, will be observed, applied and enforced.
The new rules are not unlike the local rules of practice of the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado, adopted
and effective on March 1, 1960. This is significant in that the practicing lawyer in the Denver area now has a relatively uniform
system of procedure and practice which can be followed whether
the litigation rests in the state or in the federal court.
These rules were designed to supplement the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure, and Judge Horan believes that they have dignity
equal to that of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure in that in
each instance they have the sanction of the supreme court. Whether
this shall prove to be true or not, it is significant that the new local
rules provide the answer to many questions raised and left unanswered by the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, Rule
16 of the local rules provides what shall be "reasonable notice" for
the taking of depositions under Rule 30(a) of the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure, the local rule providing that such reasonable
notice shall be five days.
*On June 10, 1961, a Denver Bar Association Institute was held on the subject of this art;c!e.
The Honorable Neil Horan and the Honorable Edward E. Pringle, Judges (then) of t~le Denver District
Court, and Eugene S. Homes and Robert H. Harry, both practicing lawyers, constituted the panel.
The writer was privileged to moderate that discussion and acknowledges that many of the quest;ons
and thoughts presented in this article were raised by the panel and the thoughtful lawyers attending
the institute.
** Member, Denver and Colorado Bar Associations and of the Denver firm of Tippit and Haskell.
1 Although the rules are not retrocctive, it is recommended that lawyers utilize the rules as to
those matters psnding pr:or to May 15, 1961; particularly those rules pertaining to pre-trial conferences.
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I. SIGNIFICANT NEw RULES

The most significant of the new rules appear to be Rules 4, 5,
6, and 7. Questions raised by these rules will be touched on later.
Their provisions are described briefly here.
Rule 4
Rule 4 deals primarily with those motions in which defenses
may be made by motion before further pleading, viz., motion to
strike, for a more definite statement, to state separately and number, for change of venue, to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter or over the person, or matters relating to process,
as well as a motion to join an indispensable party or to dismiss for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The rule
provides that within ten days after the filing of the motion a
memorandum brief must be filed containing a short concise statement of the reasons in support of the motion and citing legal authorities upon which the moving party relies. Motions to quash are
considered as motions to dismiss, and in such case memoranda
briefs should be filed.
Rule 5
Rule 5 pertains to pre-trial conferences and sets forth in explicit
detail how a case is set for pre-trial, what practice the attorneys
must follow prior to a pre-trial, as well as what shall be accomplished at the time of pre-trial.
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Rule 6
Rule 6 makes it clear that if a case is settled or otherwise
disposed of prior to any hearing the lawyer must notify the clerk's
office of such disposition or the lawyer may be subject to disciplinary action.
Rule 7
Rule 7 provides the procedure for setting a case for trial at
the time the pre-trial conference has been completed. Rule 7 contains a further significant change from the prior practice in the
Denver district courts. It provides that if it is not possible to begin
a case on the trial date set, the case shall go to the top of the trial
list for the following day and shall have priority for trial then. In
former practice, the case went to the bottom of the list for recalling
at a future date. The obvious problems raised by the prior procedure require little comment for the lawyer who has experienced
having out-of-state witnesses gathered in Division 1 waiting to give
their testimony.
II. QUESTIONS RAISED: SOME ANSWERS GIVEN
Interesting and significant questions have been raised by the
practicing lawyer as to the application of these new rules.
Rule 4
It is noted, pursuant to Rule 4, where memoranda must be filed
ten days after the filing of the specified motions, that these memoranda should be filed with the clerk of Division 1 and not the clerk
of the district court. The motions, however, should still be filed,
as in the former practice, with the clerk of the district court. Does
the party opposing the motion have the opportunity or right to
file a memorandum in opposition to the motion? The court has
indicated that the rules do not provide for a reply brief or a brief
in opposition. This is unlike the practice in the federal courts,
where an answer brief and a reply brief may be filed if the opposing party so desires. 2 The court points out that an answer brief will
not necessarily be considered if filed. It may be considered and
used, however, if the motion is deemed meritorious enough to warrant oral argument. There is sanction in Rule 4 as well, for if the
party filing the motion fails to file his memorandum within the
ten day period, the court must deny the motion. What if the ten
day limit falls on a holiday or on a Sunday-may the lawyer file
his memorandum on the succeeding business day of the court? It
would appear that Rule 6 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure
applies to the local rules, and attorneys may file on the next business day of the court without waiving any rights.
If a motion and memorandum under Rule 4 are filed, the court
has promised prompt determination of the motion." If the court
feels that the motion may be well founded, it may set the matter
2 Rule 9, Local Rules of Practice of the United
provides that the adverse party may file within ten
and if he does so, the moving party may file a
thereof.
3 If the motion docket continues at its normal
the motion Judge with a low clerk.

States District Court for the District of Colorado,
days after service a memorandum of his position;
reply memorandum within five days after service
pace, it may well become necessary to provide
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for oral argument. The rule also provides that the court may set
the time for the oral argument and the amount of time allotted for
the argument. It would seem that this provision of Rule 4 is
somewhat impractical. Many trial lawyers have arguments and
cases set for trial many months in advance. A date selected by the
trial court for an oral argument may conflict with a prior commitment of the lawyer. This could involve the motion judge in a
telephone marathon. It is also difficult to see how the court, without
knowing the position of the opposing party on a particular motion,
can allot time for the argument. This could conceivably cause a
harried and congested day in the life of the motion judge.
Rule 4 also provides that memoranda citing authorities and the
position of the moving party may not be in printed, mimeographed
or photostat form. This is obviously required to prevent the filing
of a canned brief. What type of brief should be filed with the court
in support of the moving party's position? It would seem that the
wisest course for the lawyer to follow is to file a short and concise
memorandum. This, of course, depends upon how complicated the
position of the moving party would be. Certainly a rule of thumband one welcomed by the court-would be: the briefer the better.
Rule 4 does not specifically provide for a memorandum in support of a motion for a bill of particulars. Judge Edward E. Pringle,
(formerly of the Court's Rules Committee), points out that although
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a bill of particulars is not specifically covered, the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure make no distinction between a motion for more
definite statement or bill of particulars.
If the defense of failure to state a claim against a defendant
upon which relief can be granted is asserted as a defense in the
defendant's answer, counsel need not file a memorandum in support of that particular defense. This would likewise be true for
similar defenses of failure to join an indispensable party or lack
of jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter. But a memorandum must be filed if a cross-claimant, intervenor or third party
files a Rule 4 motion directed to the pleadings of another party in
the action and the matter has not reached the pretrial conference
stage. If a memorandum is not filed, the motion will be considered
abandoned.
Rule 4 further provides that in the event the moving party
desires to support his motion by affidavits or other documentary
evidence, such affidavits and documentary evidence should accompany the original memorandum.
Rule 4 is perhaps just as significant for those motions in which
it does not require the written memoranda, such as motions for
summary judgment, judgments on the pleading, motion to elect,
and, in general, discovery motions. These are extremely important
motions, and can have disastrous effect upon the parties under
given circumstances. Perhaps a memorandum should be required
when some of those motions are asserted, except general discovery
motions.
By way of warning, it is important, under the system which
is currently being used by the court in handling motions, that the
lawyer not consolidate Rule 4 motions with other motions. For example, if the personal injury lawyer should file a motion to dismiss
and consolidate it with a motion for physical examination and
through inadvertence fail to file his memorandum in support of his
motion to dismiss, the clerk's office will notify the erring lawyer
that his pending motions have been denied. The clerk will undoubtedly fail to segregate the motion to dismiss from the motion
for a physical examination, which, of course, does not require a
written memorandum under Rule 4.
As to those motions not covered by Rule 4, the procedure will
remain the same: that is, either the moving party or the party
opposing the motion may notify opposing counsel that he will
appear in Division 1 to set the motion for hearing before the motion
judge.
If counsel for the moving party desires more time within which
to file his written memorandum in support of his motion, it is not
enough that he merely obtain permission for an extension of time
from opposing counsel. Rule 28 of the local rules provides that no
oral agreements of counsel or litigants concerning the progress or
management of any matter pending in court will be enforced by
the court, unless made in open court or with the court's approval.
The presiding judge and the presiding judge elect have made it
quite clear that oral agreements or stipulations among the parties
or their counsel will not be enforced unless the court approves the
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stipulation and enters an order pertaining thereto. The lawyer
should note this rule with extreme care, for the former practice of
obtaining an agreement by telephone or by written stipulation will
no longer be enforceable in the Denver District Court, unless the
court is advised and approves. The lawyer, therefore, may be
jeopardizing his client's position, as well as waiving his rights, if
he relies on a verbal agreement.
Finally, it should be mentioned that the moving party, if he
obtains oral argument on his motion after having filed his written
memorandum in support of that motion, will not be limited by the
court to the legal authority cited in his written memorandum.
Even though the local rules have been in operation for a short
time, the effect of Rule 4 has already been felt in that far fewer
motions covered by Rule 4 have been filed and a greater percentage
of cases are more quickly coming to issue.
Rule 5
It is clear that litigants' counsel control and manage their cases
from the moment they are filed and docketed in the Denver District
Court until the matter reaches the state of the pretrial conference.
From this point, the court firmly controls the litigation. Rule 5
provides that there shall be a pretrial conference in every contested
civil case with certain exceptions, such as domestic relations cases,
habeas corpus proceedings and proceedings to review administrative
decisions. This does not mean that a pretrial conference will be
had while the jury panel sits in the rear of the courtroom and the
lawyers have appeared prepared to commence the trial of their
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lawsuit. It is clear-and those lawyers who have already experienced a pretrial conference in the Denver District Court will confirm-that a significant, detailed and useful pre-trial conference
will be had under this new rule.
Unlike the federal court system, the Denver District Court will
not automatically set a case down for pretrial conference. This is
solely the duty of the lawyer. His case is set for pretrial by his
request and by his noticing opposing counsel into Division 1 for
the setting of the conference. In his request for pretrial conference,
counsel must state that the case is at issue, whether a jury has been
demanded, the time required for a pretrial conference, and whether
the care is entitled to a preference by statute. At the time the
reques for pretrial conference is made by counsel, he must file with
the clerk "A Certificate of Readiness" in which counsel must certify
as an 6fficer of the court that before the pretrial conference is conducted all matters required by the order setting the case for pretrial will be complied with, and that he will be prepared to try his
case within three weeks after the pretrial conference. The "Certificate of Readiness" requirement should indicate to the lawyer that
the court is serious about its new rules.
When requesting counsel obtains his conference date and appears in Division 1 pursuant to the notice he has previously given,
the presiding judge will sign an order setting the pretrial conference. It is the responsibility of counsel obtaining the order to serve
it on opposing counsel.
Rule 5 contains a typical order setting a matter for pretrial
conference. It imposes upon counsel definite and specific responsibilities. Prior to the pretrial conference, counsel must mark all
exhibits and documents which he might offer and provide copies of
these documents and exhibits for opposing counsel. 4 Counsel must
also exchange lists of witnesses upon whom they will rely for testimony and a resume of that testimony. Discovery must be completed
prior to the pretrial conference.
At the pretrial conference, each attorney must submit (this
does not have to be in writing; however, it is preferable) a concise
statement of the facts in the case, written stipulations reached by
counsel, a list of witnesses, the documentary evidence to be introduced at trial, a waiver of claims or defenses, jury instructions, a
statement of the contested issues of fact and issues of law and a
brief statement of the points of law upon which counsel intends to
rely at trial. The court has certain responsibilities at the pretrial
conferences as well. It must rule on all proposed amendments, must
decide all undecided preliminary motions, rule on the admissibility
of documentary evidence, simplify the issues and explore prospects
of settlement.
Significant in Rule 5 is the provision that counsel bring with
them either the party they represent or someone fully authorized
by that party to settle the case and make admissions. This provision, however, is not intended to turn the pretrial conference into
judicial arm-twisting to settle. Some of the judges currently sitting
4 This includes copies of oil medical reports.
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on the bench of the Denver District Court take the position that a
party present at a pretrial conference, even though he is not under
oath, may be forced to make admissions. On the other hand, some
lawyers do not believe that a party not under oath can be forced
to make an admission. The Colorado Supreme Court may have to
answer this question. The plaintiff must prepare a pretrial order, a
sample of which is found in Rule 5. The attorney for the defendant
must approve the pretrial order, both as to form and content. If
counsel for the parties cannot agree on the contents of a pretrial
order, the matter will be resolved by the trial court conducting
the pretrial conference.
Rule 5 poses several interesting questions. What if one of the
attorneys representing a party does not comply with Rule 5, does
not cooperate with counsel for the opposing party and appears at
the pretrial conference unprepared? The rules contain no specific
sanction, and it is difficult to anticipate what action, if any, the
trial court conducting the pretrial conference will take. It would
appear from the current attitude of the Denver District Court that
if the same attorney consistently fails to observe the requirements
of Rule 5, some disciplinary action will undoubtedly be taken.
The Rule 5 requirements and the form set forth therein for a
pretrial conference order and for the conduct of the pretrial conference are flexible, and may be modified as circumstances require.
For example, in a protracted case or in a case where there are
innumerable exhibits or other matters of a similar nature, the
procedures of the pretrial conference (as well as the order) may
indeed be modified.
It is noted that counsel must submit a list of witnesses and a
brief resume of their testimony at the pretrial conference; however,
the resume need not be set forth in the pretrial order. The reason
for this is obscure, particularly if the pretrial order is to be the law
of the case and the guide to the conduct of the case. The question
arises as to what happens when the resume of the testimony given
at pretrial is not the testimony that is in fact given when the trial
is conducted. This may change the course of the entire trial. What
would the court do in such a circumstance? It is suggested that the
court, upon analysis of the testimony given as compared to the testimony that was expected to be given, could, if it considered the
matter sufficient "surprise" to seriously affect the conduct of oppos-
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ing counsel's case, grant a continuance. The court should be aware
of the fact that some attorneys may use this deceptive practice in
order to obtain an advantage which they could not have otherwise
obtained under the new rules, for the basic philosophy of the new
rules is strict disclosure of one's case at a pretrial conference.
Although the rules do not provide, it is clear that plaintiff's
counsel need not list rebuttal witnesses at pretrial; it is also clear
that a summary of testimony expected of an adverse witness need
not be given.
Some lawyers question the wisdom of submitting instructions
at the pretrial conference, for the reason that in many cases instructions cannot be prepared and studied until the case is actually tried,
and the evidence is in. Having to anticipate at the pretrial conference, what instructions might be applicable may be a waste of
court's and counsel's time, as well as the client's money.
The court will consider defendant's defenses set forth in his
pleadings at the time of pretrial conference. Judge Pringle (when
acting as presiding judge elect) has indicated that the court should,
if it finds that none of the defenses asserted by defendant are
meritorious as a matter of law, enter judgment for the plaintiff
forthwith at the pretrial conference. Conversely, he also indicated
that some judges may, after a complete statement by plaintiff of
the facts which he intends to prove, decide that these facts as a
matter of law give rise to no cause of action, and enter judgment
forthwith dismissing plaintiff's complaint. What the Colorado Supreme Court would do in such a circumstance is indeed interesting
conjecture.
The pretrial order, once it is signed by the trial court, becomes
the law of the case and will govern at the trial. Generally, no
amendments will be permitted after the order is signed unless one
of the parties can show manifest injustice. It would seem clear,
for example, that if a defense having been stricken at the pretrial
conference and in the pretrial order, appears at the time of trial to
have merit, the pretrial order can be amended and the defense reinstituted and relied upon by the litigant. Although the form pretrial
order in the rules does not contain a provision for counsel to use
additional witnesses or additional documentary evidence, the court
may permit counsel to certify additional witnesses and evidence
his intent to profer additional documentary evidence if such witnesses and evidence are certified within a time specified by the
court by written notice filed with the clerk of the district court
and given to opposing counsel.
It is anticipated that trial may be held three to five weeks
after the pretrial conference is conducted. The court, in implementing these rules, intends that wherever possible the judge who conducts the pretrial conference will also preside at the trial. This, of
course, must be a flexible rule because of the practice of rotating
judges among the criminal, domestic relations, and civil divisions.
At the present time, trials are obtainable in approximately three
months after the pretrial conference is conducted. This time, of
course, will be shortened as the system governed by the new local
rules progresses.
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Rule 6
One serious problem that the district court has encountered in
the prior practice is the failure of counsel to notify the court and
the clerk's office when a case is disposed of or settled. Rule 6 of the
new local rules is aimed to correct a situation which has left the
docket of the Denver District Court loaded with antique cases, long
since settled or disposed of, but still carried on the master docket
because of counsel's failure to advise. Rule 6 provides that counsel
shall notify the clerk of the respective division in which his case
is pending in the event it is disposed of or settled. The rule has
teeth, for it provides that any violation may render counsel subject
to "disciplinary action." What disciplinary action will be invoked
remains as yet undisclosed; however, some judges presently on the
bench make it clear that action will be taken "to educate" counsel
who persist in violating this rule.
IV.

OTHER INNOVATIONS WORTH MENTION

Of the thirty-one new local rules. there are several others that
should be mentioned.
The lawyer who practices domestic relations law should note
Rule 8 which is devoted to certain practices in Division 3, the
Domestic Relations Division of the Denver District Court. He
should also be aware that many of the new local rules do not apply
to domestic relations cases. Rule 8 provides that Monday shall be
devoted to non-contested divorce cases. The rule further provides
that the plaintiff's attorney shall, in effect, protect and preserve the
rights of the non-appearing defendant by keeping him advised by
certified mail, return receipt requested, of the time and place the
case will be heard and generally of his right to be present. Rule 8
also provides the procedure which a party shall follow in cases
involving financial relief or the division of property. This rule
should be carefully observed, as there are sanctions (such as counsel's losing his right to be heard when scheduled) for failure to do
so. In the domestic relations division, no motion or petition may be
called up for hearing "forthwith;" reasonable notice to the opposing party must be given and is defined in the rules to be three
days.5
5 Except, of course, no notice would be required in ex porte proceedings.
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If the new local rules for the Denver District Court are strictly
applied, and every indication is that they will be, continuances will
be a rare thing, for Rule 9 provides that cases shall not be continued
upon stipulation of counsel alone, but continuances may be granted
only by order of court and on "good cause shown."
An interesting safeguard which may now be invoked by the
lawyer under the new local rules is the suppression of information
that an action has been filed while the process server seeks to
serve the defendants. Rule 12 of the new local rules provides that
the plaintiff may apply to the presiding judge for an order of suppression, and he may enter it in his discretion.
The new local rules of the Denver District Court also clarify
several matters pertaining to jury trials. Rule 13 provides that if
a party fails to demand a jury trial as provided by the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure, no jury trial shall be had. 6 It has been
understood in the past that the trial court could grant an untimely
request for a jury trial if in its own discretion it felt a jury trial
was warranted or advisable. There appears to be no change. 7 Rule 30
provides that the party who demands the jury trial shAll deposit a
jury fee with the clerk of the court within five days after the case
has been set for trial. This procedure, as outlined by the local rules,
has some practical implications. It would seem to be wise practice
to pay the jury fee at the time the demand for jury is made rather
than risk the possibility of inadvertent failure to pay within the
proper time period. The litigant need not worry about recovering
the jury fee in the event the case is settled, or in the event a jury
trial is thereafter waived, for the jury fee will be refunded up to
the time that the jury has reported for duty on the morning of
trial. The court has indicated that if the party demanding a jury
trial fails to pay the required jury fee and the opposing party also
wished a jury trial but made no demand because the demand had
previously been made, then he too loses his right to a jury trial.
Failure to pay the jury fee by either party within the time prescribed renders the demand for jury trial null and void.
Rule 14 of the new local rules contains another significant
change in the practice formerly followed in the Denver District
Court. It was previously the practice in the ordinary case to record,
verbatim, only the testimony taken. Often, opening statements,
closing arguments and legal arguments on motions were unreported.
As many lawyers, including the writer, are sadly aware, the failure
to request the verbatim reporting of some of these matters can
frustrate a meritorious point on review. Rule 14 provides that an
official reporter shall attend each session of the court and record
verbatim all proceedings, unless the parties, with the approval of
the judge, shall specifically agree to the contrary. Rule 14 also
eliminates another quirk of fate which often returns to haunt the
practitioner: the loss of reporter's notes or the reporter's death with
his secrets of transcription forever lost. The rule provides that the
reporter shall attach his original certificate to notes or record so
taken, together with a statement showing the date, division, name
6 Rule 13(b) goes on to soy: "However, nothing in this rule shall lmit the court from ordering
a jury trial on its own motion within the limits of its jurisdiction, or from granting a jury trial under
the modification power of the court set forth in Rule 39 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure."
7 See Jaynes v. Marrow, 355 P.2d 529 (Colo. 1961).
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of judge, caption of the case and promptly file these notes with the
clerk of the court, who will preserve them for not less than ten
years-an important safeguard to an occasional bugaboo.
Rule 16 provides a further guide to counsel who wish to take
depositions. Reasonable notice for the taking of depositions under
Rule 30(a) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure is defined
as five days. Rule 16 further provides that upon application made
within that five-day period, the time for the taking of the deposition may be enlarged or shortened. It is also interesting to note
that Rule 16 provides that the failure of the witness to appear
for the taking of his deposition pending the determination of an
application to enlarge the time for the taking thereof will not be
considered "willful failure to appear" within the meaning of Rule
37(d) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. This will obviate
the necessity of the court's hearing applications to hold the nonappearing party in contempt or to strike a litigant's pleadings.
Rule 17 of the new local rules outlines how an attorney shall
withdraw his appearance in a case. It provides very simply that
the attorney may withdraw only by court order. The order of
withdrawal may only be granted on evidence that the request to
withdraw has been served upon the client 8 and opposing counsel,
and that each has ten days to file objections to the withdrawal.
Rule 18 of the new local rules provides the method by which
an action may be dismissed for lack of prosecution. It states generally that if a case has been pending for a year and no progress
has been made in that case, or it has not been set for trial or pretrial, the clerk shall give 30 days notice within which counsel may
show good cause why the case should not be dismissed. If no showing is made, the court may enter an order of dismissal with or without prejudice. This is a departure from, and an improvement over,.
the old rule and practice where the action would be dismissed only
with prejudice. The change was effected because it was felt that.
in some extraordinary cases the dismissal with prejudice for lack
of prosecution could work a severe and unjust hardship on a litigating party. Rule 18 also provides that opposing counsel may file
a motion to dismiss the case for lack of prosecution. This is a wiseprovision and may be put to good tactical use by the lawyer.
Another interesting innovation is contained in Rule 22 which
provides that if in any proceeding a party attacks the validity or
constitutionality of a Colorado statute or a municipal ordinance,
franchise or charter provision of any Colorado municipality, that
party shall serve copies of all pleadings upon either the chief executive officer of the municipality or upon the attorney general of the.
state. It is significant to note that the notice of claim of unconstitutionality must be filed on the respective public official when the.
issue is raised in any proceeding; this could include many criminal
actions and administrative proceedings, as well as civil actions.
Those who practice criminal law should examine and study
Rule 24 of the new local rules pertaining to criminal proceedings.
This rule sets out the system of assignment of criminal cases to the.
judges in the criminal division. It also provides certain procedures
and regulations pertaining to recognizance and bonds.
8 Details of what must be contained in the notice to the client appear in the Rule itself.
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The new rules also provide an answer to a problem which
has vexed many lawyers when the decision is made to appeal an
adverse ruling of the trial court. The problem is when does the
time on appeal begin to run? When was final judgment entered?
As the lawyer knows, a slight miscalculation may forfeit the appeal.
Rule 27 of the new local rules of the Denver District Court fixes the
time for entry of judgment. It provides that judgment shall be
entered on the docket by the clerk and such entry on the judgment
docket shall constitute the entry of judgment under the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 27 further provides that when the
court directs findings of fact and conclusions of law, a judgment
or an order must be prepared and the clerk will enter on the
minutes that the attorney is ordered to prepare an order in accordance with the ruling of the court. A draft of the order and judgment is then prepared, served on opposing counsel and lodged with
the clerk for presentation to the court. If the judge is not satisfied
with the judgment, he may notice the parties in to discuss and
resolve the judgment. If opposing counsel is not satisfied with the
proposed judgment, he may file a motion to amend or correct it.
Most important, the judgment is not entered on the docket until
signed by the court.
As with all mandatory rules of practice and procedure, some
provision must be made for modification of the rule in the event
of extraordinary circumstances in which the application of the rule
would render the result manifestly unjust. Rule 31 of the new
local rules provides for just such an exigency. Modification of
the rule may be made by request in writing and an opportunity
to be heard on the modification shall be given.
It is recognized by the bench and bar that the new Denver
District Court Rules are not perfect. Those that prove to be weak
or impractical will be changed or revoked and more workable
rules adopted in their place. The bench in its implementation, and
the bar in its application, of the rules can make this step forward
in the administration of civil justice a firm one; a step which the
bench, the bar and the litigating public may justly commend.
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